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Non-Tariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization

  • Simon P. Anderson

    ()

  • Nicolas Schmitt

    ()

This paper shows that governments have no incentive to introduce non-tariff barriers when they are free to set tariffs but they do when tariffs are determined cooperatively. We then show three results. First, with trade liberalization, there is a progression from using tariffs only to quotas, and to antidumping constraints (when quotas are jointly eliminated). Second, there is a narrowing of the range of industries in which each instrument is used. Third,the degree of tariff liberalization and of replacement of tariffs by NTBs depend on industry characteristics.These results are roughly in line with the empirical evidence.

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File URL: http://www.virginia.edu/economics/RePEc/vir/virpap/papers/virpap340.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Virginia, Department of Economics in its series Virginia Economics Online Papers with number 340.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:vir:virpap:340
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.virginia.edu/economics/home.html

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  1. Baldwin, Robert E., 1984. "Trade policies in developed countries," Handbook of International Economics, in: R. W. Jones & P. B. Kenen (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 571-619 Elsevier.
  2. Anderson, S. & Schmitt, N. & Thisse, J.F., 1992. "Who Benifits from Antidumping Legislation?," Discussion Papers dp92-12, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
  3. James E. Anderson, 1993. "Domino Dumping, II: Anti-dumping," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 219, Boston College Department of Economics.
  4. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1990. "A Theory of Managed Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 779-95, September.
  5. James Brander, 1980. "Intra-Industry Trade in Identical Commodities," Working Papers 380, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  6. Anderson, James E, 1992. "Domino Dumping, I: Competitive Exporters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 65-83, March.
  7. James Brander & Paul Krugman, 1980. "A "Reciprocal Dumping" Model of International Trade," Working Papers 405, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  8. repec:att:wimass:9511 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Kaempfer, William H & Marks, Stephen V & Willett, Thomas D, 1988. "Why Do Large Countries Prefer Quantitative Trade Restrictions?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 625-46.
  10. Falvey, Rodney E & Lloyd, P J, 1991. "Uncertainty and the Choice of Protective Instrument," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(3), pages 463-78, July.
  11. Robert Baldwin & Jeffrey Steagall, 1994. "An analysis of ITC decisions in antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard cases," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 130(2), pages 290-308, June.
  12. Cassing, James H. & Hillman, Arye L., 1985. "Political influence motives and the choice between tariffs and quotas," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 279-290, November.
  13. Moore, Michael O, 1992. "Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of ITC Anti-dumping Decisions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(3), pages 449-66, July.
  14. Fischer, Ronald D., 1992. "Endogenous probability of protection and firm behavior," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-2), pages 149-163, February.
  15. Gallaway, Michael P. & Blonigen, Bruce A. & Flynn, Joseph E., 1999. "Welfare costs of the U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 211-244, December.
  16. James Nieberding, 1999. "The Effect of U.S. Antidumping Law on Firms' Market Power: An Empirical Test," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 65-84, February.
  17. Rosendorff, B Peter, 1996. "Voluntary Export Restraints, Antidumping Procedure, and Domestic Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 544-61, June.
  18. Bagwell Kyle & Staiger Robert W., 2003. "Protection and the Business Cycle," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-45, September.
  19. Brian R. Copeland, 1990. "Strategic Interaction among Nations: Negotiable and Non-negotiable Trade Barriers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(1), pages 84-108, February.
  20. Krishna, Kala, 1989. "Trade restrictions as facilitating practices," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3-4), pages 251-270, May.
  21. Ray, Edward John, 1981. "The Determinants of Tariff and Nontariff Trade Restrictions in the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(1), pages 105-21, February.
  22. Marvel, Howard P & Ray, Edward J, 1983. "The Kennedy Round: Evidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 190-97, March.
  23. Deardorff, Alan V., 1987. "Why do governments prefer nontariff barriers?," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 191-216, January.
  24. McCulloch, Rachel, 1987. "Why do governments prefer nontariff barriers? A comment on deardorff," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 217-221, January.
  25. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
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