Tariff Liberalisation and Increased Administrative Protection: Is There a Quid Pro Quo?
Theoretical models and intuition suggest that the amount of non-traditional protection such as anti-dumping duties will increase as more traditional forms such as tariffs are lowered under multilateral trade agreements. This paper is the first empirical study of the role of tariff liberalisation in the spread of anti-dumping. Through both correlations and regression approaches we analyse the relationship between tariff concessions made during the Uruguay Round trade negotiations and the filing of anti-dumping petitions, with particular interest in whether multilateral trade reductions have spurred the recent growth in new users of anti-dumping policies. We find that, at least for developing economies, tariff reductions agreed to under the Uruguay Round not only increased the likelihood of a country using anti-dumping protection but also the total number of anti-dumping petitions filed by countries. Copyright 2007 The Authors Journal compilation 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd .
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Volume (Year): 30 (2007)
Issue (Month): 6 (06)
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References listed on IDEAS
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