IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

China's WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlement

  • Chad P. Bown

This chapter assesses China's integration into the global trading system by examining areas of international political-economic "friction" associated with its increased trade. We use a number of newly constructed data sets to examine tensions associated with its rapidly increasing trade and the trade policy commitments that China and its trading partners have undertaken as part of its 2001 WTO accession. With respect to China's exports, we examine data on WTO members' use of antidumping and their discriminatory treatment of Chinese firms prior to and following accession. We conclude that the application of antidumping against China has become more discriminatory since its 2001 accession. Furthermore, evidence from a regression analysis rules out the theory that pre-accession discrimination is associated with foreign targeting of high import tariff Chinese products as a WTO accession negotiation strategy. We also provide evidence that WTO members are also discriminating against China's exports by substituting use of new import-restricting "China-safeguard" policy instruments. Next, with respect to China's imports, we examine data on China's antidumping use - now the WTO's fifth most frequent user of antidumping - by targeted sectors and countries. We also provide evidence from products within China's largest sectoral user of a positive relationship between the size of the accession year tariff liberalization and the subsequent resort to antidumping protection after accession. Finally, we examine China's experience in managing frictions associated with its growing role in world trade through formal WTO dispute settlement proceedings.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w13349.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 13349.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Aug 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as China's WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlement , Chad P. Bown. in China's Growing Role in World Trade , Feenstra and Wei. 2010
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13349
Note: ITI
Contact details of provider: Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Web page: http://www.nber.org
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Michael M. Knetter & Thomas J. Prusa, 2000. "Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings: Evidence from Four Countries," NBER Working Papers 8010, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1988. "A Theory of Managed Trade," NBER Working Papers 2756, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Robert Staiger & Frank Wolak, 1994. "Measuring Industry Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States," International Trade 9410004, EconWPA.
  4. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
  5. Michael Moore & Alan Fox, 2010. "Why don’t foreign firms cooperate in US antidumping investigations? An empirical analysis," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 145(4), pages 597-613, January.
  6. Hansen, Wendy L & Prusa, Thomas J, 1996. "Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts Is Greater Than the Whole," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(4), pages 746-69, October.
  7. Chad Bown, 2013. "How Different Are Safeguards from Antidumping? Evidence from US Trade Policies Toward Steel," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 42(4), pages 449-481, June.
  8. Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Olson, 2005. "Tariff Liberalization and Increased Administrative Protection: Is There a Quid Pro Quo?," International Trade 0501001, EconWPA.
  9. Choi, E. Kwan & Harrigan, James, 2003. "Handbook of International Trade," Staff General Research Papers 11375, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  10. Maggi, G & Rodriguez-Clare, A, 1996. "The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures," Papers 180, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
  11. Bruce A. Blonigen & Chad P. Bown, 2001. "Antidumping and Retaliation Threats," NBER Working Papers 8576, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Chad P. Bown, 2005. "Participation in," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 19(2), pages 287-310.
  13. Patrick Messerlin, 2004. "China in the World Trade Organization: Antidumping and Safeguards," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/8335, Sciences Po.
  14. Thomas J. Prusa, 1999. "On the Spread and Impact of Antidumping," NBER Working Papers 7404, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Moore, Michael O., 2006. "U.S. facts-available antidumping decisions: An empirical analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 639-652, September.
  16. Bruce A. Blonigen & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Antidumping," NBER Working Papers 8398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Robert W. Staiger & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March.
  18. Bruce A. Blonigen, 2003. "Evolving Discretionary Practices of U.S Antidumping Activity," NBER Working Papers 9625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Chad Bown & Meredith Crowley, 2003. "Trade deflection and trade depression," Working Paper Series WP-03-26, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  20. Chad P. Bown, 2005. "Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement: Why Are So Few Challenged?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 515-555, 06.
  21. Patrick A. Messerlin, 2004. "China in the World Trade Organization: Antidumping and Safeguards," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 18(1), pages 105-130.
  22. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/8335 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Horn, Henrik & Mavroidis, Petros C & Nordström, Håkan, 1999. "Is The Use Of The WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2340, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  24. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-85, December.
  25. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2006. "What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence from the World Trade Organization," NBER Working Papers 12727, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13349. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.