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China's WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlement

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  • Chad P. Bown

Abstract

This chapter assesses China's integration into the global trading system by examining areas of international political-economic "friction" associated with its increased trade. We use a number of newly constructed data sets to examine tensions associated with its rapidly increasing trade and the trade policy commitments that China and its trading partners have undertaken as part of its 2001 WTO accession. With respect to China's exports, we examine data on WTO members' use of antidumping and their discriminatory treatment of Chinese firms prior to and following accession. We conclude that the application of antidumping against China has become more discriminatory since its 2001 accession. Furthermore, evidence from a regression analysis rules out the theory that pre-accession discrimination is associated with foreign targeting of high import tariff Chinese products as a WTO accession negotiation strategy. We also provide evidence that WTO members are also discriminating against China's exports by substituting use of new import-restricting "China-safeguard" policy instruments. Next, with respect to China's imports, we examine data on China's antidumping use - now the WTO's fifth most frequent user of antidumping - by targeted sectors and countries. We also provide evidence from products within China's largest sectoral user of a positive relationship between the size of the accession year tariff liberalization and the subsequent resort to antidumping protection after accession. Finally, we examine China's experience in managing frictions associated with its growing role in world trade through formal WTO dispute settlement proceedings.

Suggested Citation

  • Chad P. Bown, 2007. "China's WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlement," NBER Working Papers 13349, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13349
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    1. Chad P. Bown, 2005. "Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement: Why Are So Few Challenged?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 515-555, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kokko, Ari & Gustavsson Tingvall, Patrik & Videnord, Josefin, 2017. "Which Antidumping Cases Reach the WTO?," Ratio Working Papers 286, The Ratio Institute.
    2. Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian, 2011. "A China Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations," Working Paper Series WP11-22, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    3. Regina M. Abrami & Yu Zheng, 2010. "The New Face of Chinese Industrial Policy: Making Sense of Anti-Dumping Cases in the Petrochemical and Steel Industries," Harvard Business School Working Papers 11-042, Harvard Business School.
    4. Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian, 2012. "China and the World Trading System," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(12), pages 1733-1771, December.
    5. Chad P. Bown, 2011. "Taking Stock of Antidumping, Safeguards and Countervailing Duties, 1990–2009," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(12), pages 1955-1998, December.
    6. Priyanka Pandit, 2013. "China and the World Trade Organization," International Studies, , vol. 50(3), pages 255-271, July.
    7. Chad P. Bown, 2007. "Canada's Anti†dumping and Safeguard Policies: Overt and Subtle Forms of Discrimination," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(9), pages 1457-1476, September.
    8. Zhang, Hongyong, 2018. "Political connections and antidumping investigations: Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 34-41.
    9. Bown, Chad P. & Crowley, Meredith A., 2013. "Import protection, business cycles, and exchange rates: Evidence from the Great Recession," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 50-64.
    10. Xiaosong Wang & Jack Hou & Faqin Lin, 2022. "ITC antidumping toward China rulings: Is political factor overwhelming?," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(1), pages 106-122, January.
    11. Haoyuan Ding & Xiao Li & Jiezhou Ying, 2023. "Anti‐dumping Policies and International Portfolio Allocation: The View from the Global Funds," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 31(2), pages 58-83, March.
    12. Datt, Mohini & Hoekman, Bernard & Malouche, Mariem, 2011. "Taking Stock of Trade Protectionism Since 2008," World Bank - Economic Premise, The World Bank, issue 72, pages 1-9, December.
    13. Baybars Karacaovali, 2011. "Turkey: Temporary Trade Barriers as Resistance to Trade Liberalization with the European Union?," Working Papers 201107, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    14. Chad P. Bown & Meredith A. Crowley, 2004. "China's export growth and U.S. trade policy," Working Paper Series WP-04-28, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    15. Irene Brambilla & Amit K. Khandelwal & Peter K. Schott, 2010. "China's Experience under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) and the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC)," NBER Chapters, in: China's Growing Role in World Trade, pages 345-387, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Chad P. Bown & Thomas J. Prusa, 2021. "U.S. Anti-dumping: Much Ado about Zeroing," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Thomas J Prusa (ed.), Economic Effects of Antidumping, chapter 10, pages 195-232, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    17. Dirk De Bièvre & Emile van Ommeren, 2021. "Multilateralism, Bilateralism and Institutional Choice: The Political Economy of Regime Complexes in International Trade Policy," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 12(S4), pages 14-24, May.
    18. Bown, Chad P., 2009. "The global resort to antidumping, safeguards, and other trade remedies amidst the economic crisis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5051, The World Bank.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy

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