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Measuring Industry Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States

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  • Robert W. Staiger
  • Frank A. Wolak

Abstract

This paper provides estimates of the trade impacts of U.S. antidumping law and the determinants of suit filing activity from 1980-1985. We study three possible channels through which the threat or mere possibility of antidumping duties can restrict trade which we believe, when combined with the direct effects of duties, capture most of the trade effects of antidumping law. We refer to these three non- duty effects as the investigation effect, the suspension effect, and the withdrawal effect. Investigation effects occur when an antidumping investigation takes place; suspension effects occur under so-called 'suspension agreements'; and withdrawal effects occur after a petition is simply withdrawn without a final determination. We find substantial trade restrictions associated with the first two effects, but not with the third. Finally, we find evidence suggesting that some firms initiate antidumping procedures for the trade restricting investigation effects alone.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1994. "Measuring Industry Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States," NBER Working Papers 4696, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4696
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1989. "Strategic Use of Antidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusion," NBER Working Papers 3016, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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