Strategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Duties
In this paper we develop a dynamic two-period model of imperfect competition to analyse the effects of European antidumping duties on firm behaviour and domestic welfare. Our model is one of the first to complement the European empirical literature on antidumping policy and can usefully be compared with papers dealing with the effects of US antidumping policy. We arrive at three important conclusions: (a) the strategic behaviour of European firms under European antidumping rules may run in the opposite direction compared to the incentives for US firms provided under the US antidumping rules; (b) US antidumping rules perform better than European rules in terms of domestic welfare and in terms of protecting domestic value added and employment; (c) the Strategic Trade Policy argument for protection need not apply for antidumping duties because the level of protection is endogenously determined by the firms involved.
Volume (Year): 8 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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