IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/reviec/v18y2010i5p796-806.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Antidumping Regulations: Anti-Competitive and Anti-Export

Author

Listed:
  • David R. Collie
  • Vo Phuong Mai Le

Abstract

In a Bertrand duopoly model, it is shown that an antidumping regulation can be strategically exploited by the home firm to reduce the degree of competition in the home market. The home firm commits not to export to the foreign market which gives the foreign firm a monopoly in its own market. As a result the foreign firm will increase its price allowing the home firm to increase its price and its profits. If the products are sufficiently close substitutes then the higher profits in the home market are large enough to compensate for the loss of profits on exports. Copyright © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • David R. Collie & Vo Phuong Mai Le, 2010. "Antidumping Regulations: Anti-Competitive and Anti-Export," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(5), pages 796-806, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:18:y:2010:i:5:p:796-806
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2010.00891.x
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Anderson, Simon P. & Schmitt, Nicolas & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1995. "Who benefits from antidumping legislation?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 321-337, May.
    2. Veugelers, Reinhilde & Vandenbussche, Hylke, 1999. "European anti-dumping policy and the profitability of national and international collusion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-28, January.
    3. Staiger, Robert W. & Wolak, Frank A., 1992. "The effect of domestic antidumping law in the presence of foreign monopoly," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3-4), pages 265-287, May.
    4. Thomas J. Prusa, 2005. "Anti-dumping: A Growing Problem in International Trade," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(5), pages 683-700, May.
    5. Prusa, Thomas J., 1992. "Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1-2), pages 1-20, August.
    6. Ronald B. Davies & Benjamin H. Liebman, 2006. "Self-protection? Antidumping Duties, Collusion, and FDI," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 741-757, November.
    7. Roger Clarke & David Collie, 2003. "Product differentiation and the gains from trade under Bertrand duopoly," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 36(3), pages 658-673, August.
    8. Webb, Michael, 1992. "The Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-dumping Laws," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(3), pages 437-448, July.
    9. Fischer, Ronald D., 1992. "Endogenous probability of protection and firm behavior," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-2), pages 149-163, February.
    10. Richard Friberg & Mattias Ganslandt, 2008. "Reciprocal Dumping with Product Differentiation," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(5), pages 942-954, November.
    11. Falvey, Rod & Wittayarungruangsri, Sarut, 2006. "Market size and antidumping in duopolistic competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 771-786, September.
    12. Roger Clarke & David R. Collie, 2008. "Maximum-revenue versus Optimum-welfare Export Taxes: a Delegation Game," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(5), pages 919-929, November.
    13. Wilfried Pauwels & Hylke Vandenbussche & Marcel Weverbergh, 2001. "Strategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Duties," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 75-99.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:aumajo:v:19:y:2011:i:3:p:189-195 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Patrice Bougette & Christophe Charlier, 2017. "Antidumping and Feed-In Tariffs as Good Buddies? Modeling the EU-China Solar Panel Dispute," GREDEG Working Papers 2017-17, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
    3. Wilfried Pauwels & Hylke Vandenbussche & Marcel Weverbergh, 2001. "Strategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Duties," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 75-99.
    4. Falvey, Rod & Wittayarungruangsri, Sarut, 2006. "Market size and antidumping in duopolistic competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 771-786, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:18:y:2010:i:5:p:796-806. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0965-7576 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.