Split Decisions in Antidumping Cases
This paper provides a rationale for split decisions in antidumping cases. A split decision occurs when the U.S. government simultaneously investigates multiple countries for dumping the same product but imposes antidumping duties on only a subset of these countries. In the U.S., 76% of antidumping petitions filed between 1980 and 2004 involved two or more countries accused of dumping the same product. Among these multi-country investigations, roughly 30% concluded with a split decision in the final stage of an investigation. The model in this paper shows that selectively applying antidumping duties against foreign countries that are selling increased quantities of imports at a price below long run average total cost improves the importing country's welfare. Imperfectly competitive firms in different countries face stochastic demand and are subject to capacity constraints. As a result, foreign firms dump when they face weak demand in their own markets. In response to the shift in a foreign country's export supply, the importing country's optimal rent-shifting tariff against the foreign country with weak demand increases while its optimal tariff against other countries falls. This paper suggests an economic rationale behind the differential treatment afforded to different countries accused of dumping.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 10 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.degruyter.com|
|Order Information:||Web: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejeap|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Thomas J. Prusa, 2001.
"On the spread and impact of anti-dumping,"
Canadian Journal of Economics,
Canadian Economics Association, vol. 34(3), pages 591-611, August.
- Prusa, Thomas J., 1992. "Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1-2), pages 1-20, August.
- Zanardi, M., 2005.
"Antidumping : A Problem in International Trade,"
2005-85, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Vandenbussche, Hylke & Wauthy, Xavier, 2001.
"Inflicting injury through product quality: how European antidumping policy disadvantages European producers,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 101-116, March.
- VANDENBUSSCHE, Hylke & WAUTHY, Xavier, "undated". "Inflicting injury through product quality: how European antidumping policy disadvantages European producers," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1508, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1990.
"The Effect of Domestic Antidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopoly,"
NBER Working Papers
3254, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Staiger, Robert W. & Wolak, Frank A., 1992. "The effect of domestic antidumping law in the presence of foreign monopoly," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3-4), pages 265-287, May.
- Vandenbussche, Hylke & Veugelers, Reinhilde, 1996.
"European Anti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National and International Collusion,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1469, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Veugelers, Reinhilde & Vandenbussche, Hylke, 1999. "European anti-dumping policy and the profitability of national and international collusion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-28, January.
- VEUGELERS, Reinhilde & VANDENBUSSCHE, Hylke, 1997. "European anti-dumping policy and the profitability of national and international collusion," SESO Working Papers 1997005, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
- Bruce A. Blonigen & Jee-Hyeong Park, 2000.
"Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Antidumping Policy: Theory and Evidence,"
University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers
2003-22, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 01 Jun 2003.
- Bruce A. Blonigen & Jee-Hyeong Park, 2004. "Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Antidumping Policy: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 134-154, March.
- Bruce A. Blonigen & Jee-Hyeong Park, 2000. "Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Antidumping Policy: Theory and Evidence," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2001-1, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 01 Jul 2001.
- Bruce A. Blonigen & Jee-Hyeong Park, 2001. "Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Antidumping Policy: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 8477, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hansen, Wendy L & Prusa, Thomas J, 1996.
"Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts Is Greater Than the Whole,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(4), pages 746-769, October.
- Wendy L. Hansen & Thomas J. Prusa, 1996. "Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater Than the Whole," Departmental Working Papers 199422, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Wendy L. Hansen & Thomas J. Prusa, 1995. "Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater thanthe Whole," NBER Working Papers 5062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Wilfried Pauwels & Hylke Vandenbussche & Marcel Weverbergh, 2001. "Strategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Duties," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 75-99.
- Patrick Messerlin, 1989. "The ec antidumping regulations: A first economic appraisal, 1980–85," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 125(3), pages 563-587, September.
- Dixit, Avinash, 1988. "Anti-dumping and countervailing duties under oligopoly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 55-68, January.
- Blonigen, Bruce A. & Bown, Chad P., 2003.
"Antidumping and retaliation threats,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 249-273, August.
- Gruenspecht, Howard K., 1988. "Dumping and dynamic competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 225-248, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:68. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.