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A comparative analysis of EU Antidumping rules and application

  • Laura ROVEGNO

    ()

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES))

  • Hylke VANDENBUSSCHE

    ()

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) and Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), KULeuven-LICOS, & CEPR)

Trade policy in the European Union is characterized by an intensive use of Antidumping measures. In this paper we compare existing practices in the EU to WTO rules and to other WTO Members. Our comparative analysis reveals that the EU's "lesser-duty rule", which limits the magnitude of the Antidumping duty to the level of domestic injury caused by dumped imports, results in a lower average duty level in EU cases, particularly when compared to the US. In terms of the "Sunset Clause", which limits the duration of protection to 5 years, the EU presents a lower share of measures lasting beyond this limit as compared to other users of Antidumping. In recent years, the number of case initiations by the EU has decreased. There has also been a shift towards the imposition of duties and away from the use of price undertakings as a protectionist measure. In line with other WTO members, an increasing share of cases are targeted against China, where it used to be predominantly Central-European countries and Japan, as well as other low or middle income countries.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) with number 2011023.

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Length: 22
Date of creation: 16 Jun 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:2011023
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  1. Cadot, Olivier & de Melo, Jaime & Tumurchudur, Bolormaa, 2007. "Anti-Dumping Sunset Reviews: The Uneven Reach of WTO Disciplines," CEPR Discussion Papers 6502, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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  4. Nogues, Julio J. & Baracat, Elias, 2005. "Political economy of antidumping and safeguards in Argentina," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3587, The World Bank.
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  7. Bown, Chad P., 2010. "Taking stock of antidumping, safeguards, and countervailingduties, 1990-2009," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5436, The World Bank.
  8. Wilfried Pauwels & Linda Springael, 2002. "The welfare effects of a european anti-dumping duty and price-undertaking policy," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(2), pages 121-135, June.
  9. Maurizio Zanardi, 2004. "Antidumping law as a collusive device," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9833, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  10. VANDENBUSSCHE, Hylke & WAUTHY, Xavier, . "Inflicting injury through product quality: how European antidumping policy disadvantages European producers," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1508, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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  15. Konings, Jozef & Vandenbussche, Hylke, 2005. "Antidumping protection and markups of domestic firms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 151-165, January.
  16. Choi, E. Kwan & Harrigan, James, 2003. "Handbook of International Trade," Staff General Research Papers 11375, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  17. Anderson, James E, 1992. "Domino Dumping, I: Competitive Exporters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 65-83, March.
  18. Taylor, Christopher T., 2004. "The economic effects of withdrawn antidumping investigations: is there evidence of collusive settlements?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 295-312, March.
  19. Tharakan, P. K. M., 1991. "The political economy of anti-dumping undertakings in the European communities," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1341-1359, August.
  20. Prusa, Thomas J., 1992. "Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1-2), pages 1-20, August.
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