A comparative analysis of EU Antidumping rules and application
Trade policy in the European Union is characterized by an intensive use of Antidumping measures. In this paper we compare existing practices in the EU to WTO rules and to other WTO Members. Our comparative analysis reveals that the EU's "lesser-duty rule", which limits the magnitude of the Antidumping duty to the level of domestic injury caused by dumped imports, results in a lower average duty level in EU cases, particularly when compared to the US. In terms of the "Sunset Clause", which limits the duration of protection to 5 years, the EU presents a lower share of measures lasting beyond this limit as compared to other users of Antidumping. In recent years, the number of case initiations by the EU has decreased. There has also been a shift towards the imposition of duties and away from the use of price undertakings as a protectionist measure. In line with other WTO members, an increasing share of cases are targeted against China, where it used to be predominantly Central-European countries and Japan, as well as other low or middle income countries.
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