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China's WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlement

In: China's Growing Role in World Trade

  • Chad P. Bown

This chapter assesses China's integration into the global trading system by examining areas of international political-economic "friction" associated with its increased trade. We use a number of newly constructed data sets to examine tensions associated with its rapidly increasing trade and the trade policy commitments that China and its trading partners have undertaken as part of its 2001 WTO accession. With respect to China's exports, we examine data on WTO members' use of antidumping and their discriminatory treatment of Chinese firms prior to and following accession. We conclude that the application of antidumping against China has become more discriminatory since its 2001 accession. Furthermore, evidence from a regression analysis rules out the theory that pre-accession discrimination is associated with foreign targeting of high import tariff Chinese products as a WTO accession negotiation strategy. We also provide evidence that WTO members are also discriminating against China's exports by substituting use of new import-restricting "China-safeguard" policy instruments. Next, with respect to China's imports, we examine data on China's antidumping use - now the WTO's fifth most frequent user of antidumping - by targeted sectors and countries. We also provide evidence from products within China's largest sectoral user of a positive relationship between the size of the accession year tariff liberalization and the subsequent resort to antidumping protection after accession. Finally, we examine China's experience in managing frictions associated with its growing role in world trade through formal WTO dispute settlement proceedings.

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This chapter was published in:
  • Robert C. Feenstra & Shang-Jin Wei, 2010. "China's Growing Role in World Trade," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number feen07-1, December.
  • This item is provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Chapters with number 10463.
    Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:10463
    Contact details of provider: Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
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    14. Patrick A. Messerlin, 2004. "China in the World Trade Organization: Antidumping and Safeguards," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 18(1), pages 105-130.
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    25. Chad Bown, 2013. "How Different Are Safeguards from Antidumping? Evidence from US Trade Policies Toward Steel," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 42(4), pages 449-481, June.
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