Why Don't Foreign Firms Cooperate in U.S. Antidumping Investigations?: An Emperical Analysis
Foreign firms face punitive duties if they do not cooperate with the US Department of Commerce (DOC) in antidumping procedures. For example, 37% of all foreign firms involved in antidumping investigations in the US chose faced facts available margins for the 1995-2002 period, with average antidumping duties of 31% for cooperating foreign firms, compared to 87% for those who do not. The existing literature has focused on how DOC discretion has led to foreign firm non-cooperation. This paper instead examines individual foreign firms decisions about whether to cooperate during this same period. We find evidence that non-cooperation is consistent with a model of foreign firms rationally choosing not to cooperate, rather than solely as a result of investigating authority bias against imports.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.gwu.edu/~iiep/|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Moore, Michael O, 1992. "Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of ITC Anti-dumping Decisions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(3), pages 449-66, July.
- Bruce A. Blonigen, 2006.
"Evolving discretionary practices of U.S. antidumping activity,"
Canadian Journal of Economics,
Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(3), pages 874-900, August.
- Bruce A. Blonigen, 2003. "Evolving Discretionary Practices of U.S Antidumping Activity," NBER Working Papers 9625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bruce A. Blonigen, 2002. "Evolving Discretionary Practices of U.S. Antidumping Activity," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2003-20, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 01 Aug 2003.
- Nelson, Douglas, 2006. "The political economy of antidumping: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 554-590, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2008-17. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kyle Renner)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.