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How different are safeguards from antidumping ? evidence from us trade policies toward steel

  • Bown, Chad P.

Use of temporary trade barriers has proliferated across countries, industries, and even policy instruments. This paper constructs a panel of bilateral, product-level United States steel imports that are matched to a unique data set on trade policy exclusions that are associated with the 2002 United States steel safeguard in order to compare the trade impacts that result from application of various temporary trade barrier policies over 1989-2003. The analysis finds that the trade effects of an applied safeguard -- which is statutorily expected to follow the principle of nondiscriminatory treatment -- can nevertheless compare closely with the application of the explicitly discriminatory antidumping policy. The results on trade policy substitutability complement other recent research on these increasingly important forms of import protection.

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Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 6378.

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Date of creation: 01 Mar 2013
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6378
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  1. Thomas J. Prusa, 1996. "The Trade Effects of U.S. Antidumping Actions," Departmental Working Papers 199603, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  2. BOWN, CHAD P. & McCULLOCH, RACHEL, 2003. "Nondiscrimination and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(03), pages 327-348, November.
  3. Davis, Steven J & Haltiwanger, John C, 1992. "Gross Job Creation, Gross Job Destruction, and Employment Reallocation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 819-63, August.
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  6. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1997. "An Economic Theory of GATT," NBER Working Papers 6049, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Wilfred J. Ethier, 2004. "Political Externalities, Nondiscrimination, and a Multilateral World," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 303-320, 08.
  8. Chad P. Bown & Meredith A. Crowley, 2013. "Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements: Evidence from Time-Varying Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 1071-90, April.
  9. Bown, Chad P. & Crowley, Meredith A., 2012. "Import protection, business cycles, and exchange rates : evidence from the great recession," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6038, The World Bank.
  10. Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "On the spread and impact of anti-dumping," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 34(3), pages 591-611, August.
  11. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2011. "What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence from the World Trade Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1238-73, June.
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  13. Meredith Crowley, 2004. "The worldwide spread of antidumping protection," Chicago Fed Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Jan.
  14. Bown, Chad P., 2002. "Why are safeguards under the WTO so unpopular?," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(01), pages 47-62, March.
  15. Jozef Konings & Hylke Vandenbussche & Linda Springael, 2001. "Import Diversion under European Antidumping Policy," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 283-299, September.
  16. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 2004. "Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT/WTO," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 1-29, May.
  17. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1993. "Multilateral Tariff Cooperation During the Formation of Free Trade Areas," Discussion Papers 1048, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  18. Christian Broda & Nuno Limao & David E. Weinstein, 2008. "Optimal Tariffs and Market Power: The Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(5), pages 2032-65, December.
  19. Durling, James P. & Prusa, Thomas J., 2006. "The trade effects associated with an antidumping epidemic: The hot-rolled steel market, 1996-2001," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 675-695, September.
  20. Benjamin H. Liebman & Kasaundra M. Tomlin, 2008. "Safeguards and Retaliatory Threats," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(2), pages 351-376, 05.
  21. Benjamin H. Liebman & Kasaundra M. Tomlin, 2006. "Steel Safeguards and the Welfare of U.S. Steel Firms and Downstream Consumers of Steel: A Shareholder Wealth Perspective," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp144, IIIS.
  22. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Ben Goodrich, 2003. "Next Move in Steel: Revocation or Retaliation?," Policy Briefs PB03-10, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
  23. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1988. "A Theory of Managed Trade," NBER Working Papers 2756, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. Levy, Philip I, 1997. "A Political-Economic Analysis of Free-Trade Agreements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 506-19, September.
  25. Bown, Chad P. & Crowley, Meredith A., 2007. "Trade deflection and trade depression," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 176-201, May.
  26. Bruce A. Blonigen & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Antidumping," NBER Working Papers 8398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. Arellano, Manuel & Bond, Stephen, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 277-97, April.
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