Does Antidumping Protection Raise Market Power? Evidence from Firm Level Data
This paper empirically tests the effects of Anti-Dumping (AD) protection on the price-cost margin of firms. To this end, we use a rich panel data set of 1,666 EU producers that were involved in AD cases initiated in 1996. Our findings indicate that price-cost margins in most cases significantly increase in the period of protection compared to a period before protection. In industries where competition is very tough before protection, we fail to find an increase in price-cost margins, while in industries with positive mark-ups before protection, trade policy raises market power between 3% points and 15% points, depending on the sector. Our results are robust to alternative specifications and estimation techniques. Our findings are also consistent with recent theoretical models that deal with the economic effects of firm behavior in response to AD protection.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
|Order Information:|| Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou & Knetter, Michael M., 1999.
"Measuring the intensity of competition in export markets,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 27-60, February.
- Pinelopi K. Goldberg & Michael M. Knetter, 1995. "Measuring the Intensity of Competition in Export Markets," NBER Working Papers 5226, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Head, Keith & Ries, John, 1999. "Rationalization effects of tariff reductions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 295-320, April.
- Jozef Konings & Hylke Vandenbussche & Linda Springael, 2001.
"Import Diversion under European Antidumping Policy,"
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade,
Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 283-299, September.
- Hylke Vandenbussche & Jozef Konings & Linda Springael, 1999. "Import Diversion under European Antidumping Policy," NBER Working Papers 7340, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Konings, Jozef & Springael, Linda & Vandenbussche, Hylke, 2001. "Import Diversion under European Antidumping Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 2785, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Markusen, James R. & Venables, Anthony J, 1986.
"Trade Policy with Increasing Returns and Imperfect Competition: Contradictory Results from Competing Assumptions,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
120, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Markusen, James R. & Venables, Anthony J., 1988. "Trade policy with increasing returns and imperfect competition : Contradictory results from competing assumptions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3-4), pages 299-316, May.
- Bernard, Andrew B. & Bradford Jensen, J., 1999.
"Exceptional exporter performance: cause, effect, or both?,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 1-25, February.
- Bernard, A., 1997. "Exceptional Exporter Performance: Cause, Effect, or Both?," Working papers 97-21, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Andrew B. Bernard & J. Bradford Jensen, 1997. "Exceptional Exporter Performance: Cause, Effect, or Both?," NBER Working Papers 6272, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Basu, Susanto & Fernald, John G, 1997.
"Returns to Scale in U.S. Production: Estimates and Implications,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 249-83, April.
- Susanto Basu & John G. Fernald, 1996. "Returns to scale in U.S. production: estimates and implications," International Finance Discussion Papers 546, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter.
- Arellano, Manuel & Bond, Stephen, 1991.
"Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 277-97, April.
- Tom Doan, . "RATS program to replicate Arellano-Bond 1991 dynamic panel," Statistical Software Components RTZ00169, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Levinsohn, James, 1993.
"Testing the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 1-22, August.
- Levinsohn, J., 1991. "Testing the Imports-As-Market-Discipline Hypothesis," Working Papers 272, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
- James Levinsohn, 1991. "Testing the Imports-as-Market-Discipline Hypothesis," NBER Working Papers 3657, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert E. Hall, 1986.
"The Relation Between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry,"
NBER Working Papers
1785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hall, Robert E, 1988. "The Relation between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(5), pages 921-47, October.
- Vandenbussche, Hylke & Wauthy, Xavier, 2001.
"Inflicting injury through product quality: how European antidumping policy disadvantages European producers,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 101-116, March.
- VANDENBUSSCHE, Hylke & WAUTHY, Xavier, . "Inflicting injury through product quality: how European antidumping policy disadvantages European producers," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1508, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Julio J. Rotemberg & Michael Woodford, 1991. "Markups and the Business Cycle," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1991, Volume 6, pages 63-140 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brander, James A., 1995.
"Strategic trade policy,"
Handbook of International Economics,
in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1395-1455
- Bottasso, Anna & Sembenelli, Alessandro, 2001. "Market power, productivity and the EU Single Market Program: Evidence from a panel of Italian firms," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 167-186, January.
- Bruce A. Blonigen & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Antidumping," NBER Working Papers 8398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Harrison, Ann E., 1994. "Productivity, imperfect competition and trade reform : Theory and evidence," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-2), pages 53-73, February.
- Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, 1989. "Tariffs vs Quotas with Implicit Collusion," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(2), pages 237-44, May.
- Fisher, Franklin M & McGowan, John J, 1983. "On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 82-97, March.
- Fischer, Ronald D., 1992. "Endogenous probability of protection and firm behavior," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-2), pages 149-163, February.
- Krishna, Pravin & Mitra, Devashish, 1998.
"Trade liberalization, market discipline and productivity growth: new evidence from India,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 447-462, August.
- Pravin Krishna & Devashish Mitra, . "Trade Liberalization, Market Discipline and Productivity Growth: New Evidence From India," Working Papers 96-8, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Joaquim Oliveira Martins & Stefano Scarpetta, 1999. "The Levels and Cyclical Behaviour of Mark-ups Across Countries and Market Structures," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 213, OECD Publishing.
- Reitzes, James D, 1993. "Antidumping Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(4), pages 745-63, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3571. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask to update the entry or send us the correct address
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.