IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Steel Safeguards and the Welfare of U.S. Steel Firms and Downstream Consumers of Steel: A Shareholder Wealth Perspective


  • Benjamin H. Liebman
  • Kasaundra M. Tomlin


This paper analyzes the steel safeguards implemented and subsequently removed during 2001-2003. Our results reveal that for shareholders of U.S. steel companies, safeguards generated positive “abnormal” returns of approximately 6%; and the cancellation of the safeguards resulted in wealth gains of about 5%. Steel shareholders experienced negative abnormal returns of -5% in response to the WTO ruling that the U.S. violated WTO law. The results here are consistent with the neoclassical view that producers gain at the expense of consumers. Downstream consumers in transportation equipment and electrical equipment showed the clearest negative reaction to the safeguards. Moreover, steel firms that received larger cash disbursements under the Byrd amendment received additional wealth gains when the safeguard duties were imposed. Finally, empirical results indicate that U.S. downstreamconsuming firms that diversify production in NAFTA countries avert some trade policy risk associated with the initiation of the safeguard investigation and the imposition of the safeguard duties.

Suggested Citation

  • Benjamin H. Liebman & Kasaundra M. Tomlin, 2006. "Steel Safeguards and the Welfare of U.S. Steel Firms and Downstream Consumers of Steel: A Shareholder Wealth Perspective," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp144, IIIS.
  • Handle: RePEc:iis:dispap:iiisdp144
    Note: Length:

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Rehbein, Kathleen & Starks, Laura T., 1995. "Changes in U.S. trade policies: the wealth effects on Japanese steel firms," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 309-327, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Sébastien Jean & Ariell Reshef, 2017. "Why Trade, and What Would Be the Consequences of Protectionism?," CEPII Policy Brief 2017-18, CEPII research center.
    2. Benjamin H. Liebman & Kasaundra M. Tomlin, 2008. "Safeguards and Retaliatory Threats," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(2), pages 351-376, May.
    3. Chad Bown, 2013. "How Different Are Safeguards from Antidumping? Evidence from US Trade Policies Toward Steel," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 42(4), pages 449-481, June.
    4. Ronald B. Davies & Zuzanna Studnicka, 2017. "The Heterogeneous Impact of Brexit: Early Indications from the FTSE," CESifo Working Paper Series 6478, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Nisha Malhotra & Sumeet Gulati, 2010. "The Effects Of The 1996 U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement On The Industrial Users Of Lumber: An Event Study," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(2), pages 275-287, April.
    6. Benjamin Liebman & Kasaundra Tomlin, 2015. "World Trade Organization sanctions, implementation, and retaliation," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 715-745, March.
    7. Ronald B. Davies & Benjamin H. Liebman & Kasaundra Tomlin, 2015. "I've Been Everywhere (Except Mexico): Investor Responses to NAFTA's Cross-Border Trucking Provisions," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp467, IIIS.

    More about this item


    Antidumping Policy; Welfare;

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iis:dispap:iiisdp144. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Colette Keleher). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.