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Steel Safeguards and the Welfare of U.S. Steel Firms and Downstream Consumers of Steel: A Shareholder Wealth Perspective

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  • Benjamin H. Liebman
  • Kasaundra M. Tomlin

Abstract

This paper analyzes the steel safeguards implemented and subsequently removed during 2001-2003. Our results reveal that for shareholders of U.S. steel companies, safeguards generated positive “abnormal” returns of approximately 6%; and the cancellation of the safeguards resulted in wealth gains of about 5%. Steel shareholders experienced negative abnormal returns of -5% in response to the WTO ruling that the U.S. violated WTO law. The results here are consistent with the neoclassical view that producers gain at the expense of consumers. Downstream consumers in transportation equipment and electrical equipment showed the clearest negative reaction to the safeguards. Moreover, steel firms that received larger cash disbursements under the Byrd amendment received additional wealth gains when the safeguard duties were imposed. Finally, empirical results indicate that U.S. downstreamconsuming firms that diversify production in NAFTA countries avert some trade policy risk associated with the initiation of the safeguard investigation and the imposition of the safeguard duties.

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  • Benjamin H. Liebman & Kasaundra M. Tomlin, 2006. "Steel Safeguards and the Welfare of U.S. Steel Firms and Downstream Consumers of Steel: A Shareholder Wealth Perspective," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp144, IIIS.
  • Handle: RePEc:iis:dispap:iiisdp144
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    Cited by:

    1. Sébastien Jean & Ariell Reshef, 2017. "Why Trade, and What Would Be the Consequences of Protectionism?," CEPII Policy Brief 2017-18, CEPII research center.
    2. Benjamin H. Liebman & Kasaundra M. Tomlin, 2008. "Safeguards and Retaliatory Threats," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(2), pages 351-376, May.
    3. Davies, Ronald B. & Studnicka, Zuzanna, 2018. "The heterogeneous impact of Brexit: Early indications from the FTSE," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 1-17.
    4. Chad Bown, 2013. "How Different Are Safeguards from Antidumping? Evidence from US Trade Policies Toward Steel," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 42(4), pages 449-481, June.
    5. Nisha Malhotra & Sumeet Gulati, 2010. "The Effects Of The 1996 U.S.‐Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement On The Industrial Users Of Lumber: An Event Study," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(2), pages 275-287, April.
    6. Benjamin Liebman & Kasaundra Tomlin, 2015. "World Trade Organization sanctions, implementation, and retaliation," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 715-745, March.
    7. Ronald B. Davies & Benjamin H. Liebman & Kasaundra Tomlin, 2015. "I've Been Everywhere (Except Mexico): Investor Responses to NAFTA's Cross-Border Trucking Provisions," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp467, IIIS.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antidumping Policy; Welfare;

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business

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