Do Anti-Dumping Rules Facilitate the Abuse of Market Dominance?
We discuss the effects of AD-protection in a standard Dixit model of entry deterrence. In an AD-regime, the newcomer is constrained by a minimum-price rule in addition to existing irreversible entrance costs. For minimum prices which lie below the Stackelberg one, we find that AD- rules distort competition. We show that AD-protection increases the advantages of entry deterrence for a wide range of combinations of sunk costs and minimum prices. When entrance costs are hight, consumer welfare is lower in an AD-regime than under free trade. Consequently, AD-protection facilitates the abuse of market dominance.
|Date of creation:||20 Aug 2001|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||Type of Document - Acrobat; prepared on Linux; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 39 ; figures: included|
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