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Antidumping and Market Competition: Implications for Emerging Economies

Author

Listed:
  • Chad P. Bown

    (The World Bank)

  • Rachel McCulloch

    () (Department of Economics, Brandeis University)

Abstract

While the original justification of the antidumping laws in the industrial economies was to protect domestic consumers against predation by foreign suppliers, by the early 1990s the laws and their use had evolved so much that the opposite concern arose. Rather than attacking anti-competitive behavior, dumping complaints by domestic firms were being used to facilitate collusion among suppliers and enforce cartel arrangements. This paper examines the predation and anti-competitiveness issues from the perspective of the “new users” of antidumping—the major emerging economies for which antidumping is now a major tool in the trade policy arsenal. We examine these concerns in light of important ways in which the world economy and international trading system have been changing since the early 1990s, including more firms and more countries participating in international trade, but also more extensive links among suppliers and consumers through multinational firm activity and vertical specialization.

Suggested Citation

  • Chad P. Bown & Rachel McCulloch, 2012. "Antidumping and Market Competition: Implications for Emerging Economies," Working Papers 50, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Businesss School.
  • Handle: RePEc:brd:wpaper:50
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    File URL: http://www.brandeis.edu/economics/RePEc/brd/doc/Brandeis_WP50.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2012
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antidumping; Temporary trade barriers; Competition; Antitrust; WTO;

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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