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Antidumping and Market Competition: Implications for Emerging Economies

  • Chad P. Bown

    (The World Bank)

  • Rachel McCulloch

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Brandeis University)

While the original justification of the antidumping laws in the industrial economies was to protect domestic consumers against predation by foreign suppliers, by the early 1990s the laws and their use had evolved so much that the opposite concern arose. Rather than attacking anti-competitive behavior, dumping complaints by domestic firms were being used to facilitate collusion among suppliers and enforce cartel arrangements. This paper examines the predation and anti-competitiveness issues from the perspective of the “new users” of antidumping—the major emerging economies for which antidumping is now a major tool in the trade policy arsenal. We examine these concerns in light of important ways in which the world economy and international trading system have been changing since the early 1990s, including more firms and more countries participating in international trade, but also more extensive links among suppliers and consumers through multinational firm activity and vertical specialization.

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File URL: http://www.brandeis.edu/departments/economics/RePEc/brd/doc/Brandeis_WP50.pdf
File Function: First version, 2012
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Businesss School in its series Working Papers with number 50.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:brd:wpaper:50
Contact details of provider: Postal:
MS032, P.O. Box 9110, Waltham, MA 02454-9110

Web page: http://www.brandeis.edu/departments/economics/

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  1. Patrick A. Messerlin, 1990. "Anti-Dumping Regulations or Pro-Cartel Law? The EC Chemical Cases," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(4), pages 465-492, December.
  2. Maurizio Zanardi & Michael Owen Moore, 2008. "Does Antidumping Use Contribute to Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries?," Working Papers 2008-01, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
  3. Douglas R. Nelson & Hylke Vandenbussche (ed.), 2005. "The WTO and Anti-Dumping," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, volume 0, number 3275.
  4. Bown, Chad P. & Crowley, Meredith A., 2010. "Self-enforcing trade agreements : evidence from time-varying trade policy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5223, The World Bank.
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  8. Michael Moore, 2015. "Sanctuary markets and antidumping: an empirical analysis of U.S. exporters," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 151(2), pages 309-328, May.
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  11. Thomas Prusa & Susan Skeath, 2002. "The economic and strategic motives for antidumping filings," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 138(3), pages 389-413, September.
  12. Dean, Judith M. & Lovely, Mary E. & Mora, Jesse, 2009. "Decomposing China-Japan-U.S. trade: Vertical specialization, ownership, and organizational form," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 596-610, November.
  13. Robert Staiger & Frank Wolak, 1994. "Measuring Industry Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States," International Trade 9410004, EconWPA.
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  15. Staiger, Robert W. & Wolak, Frank A., 1992. "The effect of domestic antidumping law in the presence of foreign monopoly," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3-4), pages 265-287, May.
  16. Hylke Vandenbussche & Maurizio Zanardi, 2010. "The chilling trade effects of antidumping proliferation," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/136355, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  17. Peter Egger & Douglas Nelson, . "How Bad is Antidumping?: Evidence from Panel Data," Discussion Papers 07/17, University of Nottingham, GEP.
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  28. repec:aei:rpbook:24565 is not listed on IDEAS
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