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Antidumping jumping: Reciprocal antidumping and industrial location

Author

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  • Jan Haaland
  • Ian Wooton

Abstract

Anti-dumping policies are often justified as legitimate actions by governments in their efforts to protect domestic producers from unfair foreign competition. We investigate the impact of anti-dumping rules on firms' production decisions as to how much and where to produce. Anti-dumping measures may have unforeseen effects if they induce direct foreign investment and consequently increase domestic competition. We therefore focus on location choice and consider the strategies of national governments attempting to advance the interests of their citizens through anti-dumping legislation. Our analysis also has implications for the effects of market integration policies, such as Europe 1992.
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Suggested Citation

  • Jan Haaland & Ian Wooton, 1998. "Antidumping jumping: Reciprocal antidumping and industrial location," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 134(2), pages 340-362, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:weltar:v:134:y:1998:i:2:p:340-362 DOI: 10.1007/BF02708100
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brander, James & Krugman, Paul, 1983. "A 'reciprocal dumping' model of international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 313-321.
    2. Anderson, Simon P. & Schmitt, Nicolas & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1995. "Who benefits from antidumping legislation?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 321-337.
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    7. Anderson, James E, 1992. "Domino Dumping, I: Competitive Exporters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 65-83.
    8. Prusa, Thomas J., 1992. "Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 1-20.
    9. Hartigan, James C, 1996. "Perverse Consequences of the GATT: Export Subsidies and Switching Costs," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 63(249), pages 153-161, February.
    10. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1987. "Foreign direct investment with unemployment and endogenous taxes and tariffs," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 257-279.
    11. Bhagwati, Jagdish N & Dinopoulos, Elias & Wong, Kar-yiu, 1992. "Quid Pro Quo Foreign Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 186-190.
    12. Ignatius J. Horstmann & James R. Markusen, 1990. "Endogenous Market Structures in International Trade," NBER Working Papers 3283, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. René Belderbos, 1997. "Antidumping and tariff Jumping: Japanese firms’ DFI in the European union and the United States," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 133(3), pages 419-457, September.
    14. Gruenspecht, Howard K., 1988. "Dumping and dynamic competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 225-248.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Cole, Matthew T. & Davies, Ronald B., 2011. "Strategic tariffs, tariff jumping, and heterogeneous firms," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 480-496, May.
    2. Matthew T. Cole & Ronald B. Davies, 2009. "Optimal tariffs, tariff jumping, and heterogeneous firms," Working Papers 200919, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    3. Yasukazu Ichino, 2013. "Antidumping Petition, Foreign Direct Investment, and Strategic Exports," Research in World Economy, Research in World Economy, Sciedu Press, vol. 4(1), pages 22-34, March.
    4. Sourafel Girma & David Greenaway & Katherine Wakelin, 2002. "Does antidumping stimulate FDI? Evidence from Japanese firms in the UK," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), pages 414-436.
      • Torsten Tewes & Valdas Samonis & Barbara Kauffmann & Jamuna Agarwal & Hartmut Picht & Siegfried Franke & Ulrich Hiemenz & Alfred Boss & Federico Foders & Norbert Wagner & Torsten Tewes, 1989. "Rezension," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), pages 639-658.
    5. Haufler, Andreas & Wooton, Ian, 1999. "Country size and tax competition for foreign direct investment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 121-139.
    6. Haufler, Andreas & Wooton, Ian, 1999. "Country size and tax competition for foreign direct investment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 121-139.
    7. Belderbos, Rene & Vandenbussche, Hylke & Veugelers, Reinhilde, 1999. "Undertakings and Antidumping Jumping FDI in Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 2320, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. René Belderbos, 2003. "Antidumping and foreign divestment: Japanese electronics multinationals in the EU," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 139(1), pages 131-160, March.
    9. Falvey, Rod & Wittayarungruangsri, Sarut, 2006. "Market size and antidumping in duopolistic competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 771-786, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    F12; F13; L11;

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms

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