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Anti-Dumping Jumping: Reciprocal Anti-Dumping and Indutrial Location

  • Haaland, J.I.
  • Wooton, I.

Anti-dumping policies are often justified as legitimate actions by governments in their efforts to protect domestic producers from unfair foreign competition. We investigate the impact of anti-dumping rules on firms' production decisions as to how much and where to produce. Anti-dumping measures may have unforeseen effects if they induce direct foreign investment and consequently increase domestic competition. We therefore focus on location choice and consider the strategies of national governments attempting to advance the interests of their citizens through anti-dumping legislation. Our analysis also has implications for the effects of market integration policies, such as Europe 1992.

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Paper provided by Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration- in its series Papers with number 22/95.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:norgee:22/95
Phone: 5595 9000
Fax: 5595 9100
Web page:

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  1. René Belderbos, 1997. "Antidumping and tariff Jumping: Japanese firms’ DFI in the European union and the United States," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 419-457, September.
  2. Haaland, J.I. & Wooton, I., 1992. "Market Integration, Competition, and Welfare," Papers 03-92, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  3. Smith, Alasdair & Venables, Anthony J, 1988. "Completing the Internal Market in the European Community: Some Industry Simulations," CEPR Discussion Papers 233, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Prusa, Thomas J., 1992. "Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1-2), pages 1-20, August.
  5. Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1990. "The Effect of Domestic Antidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopoly," NBER Working Papers 3254, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Bhagwati, Jagdish N & Dinopoulos, Elias & Wong, Kar-yiu, 1992. "Quid Pro Quo Foreign Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 186-90, May.
  7. Anderson, Simon P. & Schmitt, Nicolas & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1995. "Who benefits from antidumping legislation?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 321-337, May.
  8. Anderson, James E, 1992. "Domino Dumping, I: Competitive Exporters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 65-83, March.
  9. James Brander & Paul Krugman, 1982. "A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade," Working Papers 513, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  10. Gruenspecht, Howard K., 1988. "Dumping and dynamic competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 225-248, November.
  11. Ignatius J. Horstmann & James R. Markusen, 1990. "Endogenous Market Structures in International Trade," NBER Working Papers 3283, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1987. "Foreign direct investment with unemployment and endogenous taxes and tariffs," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3-4), pages 257-279, May.
  13. Hartigan, James C, 1996. "Perverse Consequences of the GATT: Export Subsidies and Switching Costs," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 63(249), pages 153-61, February.
  14. Reitzes, James D, 1993. "Antidumping Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(4), pages 745-63, November.
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