Overcoming Free Riding: A Cross Country Analysis of Firm Participation in Antidumping Petitions
This research is one of the first attempts to investigate the proliferation of antidumping protection from the firm-level and, in particular, to study the reasons why the free-riding problem may be more or less severe in particular countries or industries. Using a panel of data on the number of firms filing antidumping petitions in 10 countries between 1995 and 2005, I study the determinants of the industry's ability to overcome the free-riding problem. I find clear evidence that more firms will participate in antidumping petitions the lower the cost of filing; these filing costs significantly decrease in such variables as the number of countries targeted at one time and the level of development of the country. There is little evidence, however, that firms perceive that the expected benefits of the petition will be higher if they choose to participate, thus alleviating the free-rider problem. A separate statistical evaluation of actual case outcomes suggests that this perception may be valid.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Thomas Prusa & Michael Knetter, 2000.
"Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings: Evidence from Four Countries,"
Departmental Working Papers
200023, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Knetter, Michael M. & Prusa, Thomas J., 2003. "Macroeconomic factors and antidumping filings: evidence from four countries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 1-17, October.
- Michael M. Knetter & Thomas J. Prusa, 2000. "Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings: Evidence from Four Countries," NBER Working Papers 8010, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- William Greene, 2007. "Correlation in Bivariate Poisson Regression Model," Working Papers 07-15, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Magee, Christopher, 2002. "Endogenous trade policy and lobby formation: an application to the free-rider problem," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 449-471, August.
- Hansen, Wendy L & Prusa, Thomas J, 1996.
"Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts Is Greater Than the Whole,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(4), pages 746-69, October.
- Wendy L. Hansen & Thomas J. Prusa, 1995. "Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater thanthe Whole," NBER Working Papers 5062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Wendy L. Hansen & Thomas J. Prusa, 1996. "Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater Than the Whole," Departmental Working Papers 199422, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Robert M. Feinberg, 2005. "U.S. Antidumping Enforcement and Macroeconomic Indicators Revisited: Do Petitioners Learn?," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 141(4), pages 612-622, December.
- Kara M. Olson, 2004. "Free Riders Among the Rent-Seekers: A Model of Firm Participation in Antidumping Petitions," International Trade 0404009, EconWPA.
- Grossman,G.M. & Helpman,E., 1995.
"Rent Dissipation, Free Riding, and Trade Policy,"
31-95, Tel Aviv.
- Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Reynolds, 2006.
"The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of Retaliation in Filings,"
Southern Economic Journal,
Southern Economic Association, vol. 72(4), pages 877–890, April.
- Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Olson, 2004. "The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of Retaliation in Filings," International Trade 0411003, EconWPA.
- Kara M. Reynolds, 2009. "From Agreement to Application: An Analysis of Determinations under the WTO Antidumping Agreement," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(5), pages 969-985, November.
- Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Olson, 2005.
"Tariff Liberalization and Increased Administrative Protection: Is There a Quid Pro Quo?,"
- Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Reynolds, 2007. "Tariff Liberalisation and Increased Administrative Protection: Is There a Quid Pro Quo?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(6), pages 948-961, 06.
- Alessandro Nicita & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2007. "Trade, Production, and Protection Database, 1976--2004," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 21(1), pages 165-171.
- Bown, Chad P., 2005. "Global antidumping database version 1.0," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3737, The World Bank.
- Herander, Mark G & Pupp, Roger L, 1991. "Firm Participation in Steel Industry Lobbying," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(1), pages 134-47, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:amu:wpaper:2009-01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Meal)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.