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Rent Dissipation, Free Riding, and Trade Policy

Author

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  • Grossman,G.M.
  • Helpman,E.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Grossman,G.M. & Helpman,E., 1995. "Rent Dissipation, Free Riding, and Trade Policy," Papers 31-95, Tel Aviv.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:31-95
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    Cited by:

    1. Paola Conconi & Carlo Perroni, 2012. "Conditional versus unconditional trade concessions for developing countries," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 45(2), pages 613-631, May.
    2. Oldřich Krpec & Vladan Hodulák, 2013. "Konkurenceschopnost národních ekonomik - kritická reflexe konceptu [Competitiveness of National Economy: Critical Reflection]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2013(6), pages 752-769.
    3. Furtan, William Hartley & Jensen, Maria Skovager & Sauer, Johannes, 2008. "Rent Seeking and the Common Agricultural Policy: Do member countries free ride on lobbying?," 107th Seminar, January 30-February 1, 2008, Sevilla, Spain 6600, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    4. Baldwin, Robert Edward & Baldwin, Richard Edward, 1996. "Alternate approaches to the political economy of endogenous trade liberalization," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 775-782, April.
    5. Alena Kimakova, 2010. "A Political Economy Model of Health Insurance Policy," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 38(1), pages 23-36, March.
    6. Tanapong Potipiti & Wisarut Suwanprasert, 2019. "Why Does the WTO Prohibit Export Subsidies But Not Import Tariffs?," PIER Discussion Papers 119, Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research.
    7. Philipp Maier, 2008. "A Wave of Protectionism? An Analysis of Economic and Political Considerations," Staff Working Papers 08-2, Bank of Canada.
    8. Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(5), pages 1064-1093, September.
    9. Kara M. Reynolds, 2009. "Overcoming Free Riding: A Cross Country Analysis of Firm Participation in Antidumping Petitions," Working Papers 2009-01, American University, Department of Economics.
    10. Meng, Xuechen & Li, Jianfeng & Zhou, Xiaoying & Yao, Xiaoyang, 2024. "Transportation infrastructure, market access, and firms’ export competition: Evidence from China," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    11. Ram C. Acharya, 2018. "Endogenous trade policy in general equilibrium: An interaction of redistribution rule, trade openness, and labor market condition," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 423-443, November.
    12. Richard Baldwin, 2010. "Unilateral Tariff Liberalisation," NBER Working Papers 16600, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Tovar, Patricia, 2009. "The effects of loss aversion on trade policy: Theory and evidence," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 154-167, June.
    14. Amrita Saha & Vikrant Shirodkar & Thomas C. Lawton, 2023. "Bimodal lobbying and trade policy outcomes: Evidence from corporate political activity under uncertainty in India," Journal of International Business Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 6(1), pages 24-46, March.
    15. David P. Baron, 2001. "Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority‐Rule and Executive Institutions," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 47-89, March.
    16. Damania, R., 2001. "When the Weak Win: The Role of Investment in Environmental Lobbying," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-22, July.
    17. Xiaobo Lü & Kenneth F. Scheve & Matthew J. Slaughter, 2010. "Envy, Altruism, and the International Distribution of Trade Protection," NBER Working Papers 15700, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Richard Damania, 2003. "Protectionist Lobbying and Strategic Investment," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 79(244), pages 57-69, March.
    19. Furtan, H. & Jensen, M.S. & Sauer, J., . "Rent Seeking and the Common Agricultural Policy: Do member countries free ride in lobying?," Proceedings “Schriften der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaues e.V.”, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA), vol. 44.
    20. Achim Voss & Mark Schopf, 2018. "Special interest politics: Contribution schedules vs. Nash bargaining," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 256-273, July.
    21. Achim Voss & Mark Schopf, 2016. "Special Interest Politics: Contribution Schedules versus Nash Bargaining," Working Papers Dissertations 27, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    22. Miljkovic, Dragan & Jin, Hyun J. & Paul, Rodney, 2008. "The role of productivity growth and farmers' income protection policies in the decline of relative farm prices in the United States," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 873-885.
    23. Nuno Limão & Arvind Panagariya, 2018. "Inequality and endogenous trade policy outcomes," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Policy Externalities and International Trade Agreements, chapter 8, pages 237-254, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..

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