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When the Weak Win: The Role of Investment in Environmental Lobbying

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  • Damania, R.

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  • Damania, R., 2001. "When the Weak Win: The Role of Investment in Environmental Lobbying," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-22, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:42:y:2001:i:1:p:1-22
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baldwin, Robert E., 1984. "Trade policies in developed countries," Handbook of International Economics,in: R. W. Jones & P. B. Kenen (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 571-619 Elsevier.
    2. Anderson, Kym, 1995. "Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and Poor Countries," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 401-423, January.
    3. Dixit, Avinash & Londregan, John, 1995. "Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(04), pages 856-866, December.
    4. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    5. Hettige, Hemamala & Lucas, Robert E B & Wheeler, David, 1992. "The Toxic Intensity of Industrial Production: Global Patterns, Trends, and Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 478-481, May.
    6. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1984. "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 361-366, May.
    7. Leidy, Michael P & Hoekman, Bernard M, 1994. "'Cleaning Up' while Cleaning Up? Pollution Abatement, Interest Groups and Contingent Trade Policies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(3-4), pages 241-258, March.
    8. repec:cup:apsrev:v:88:y:1994:i:01:p:33-47_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Rent dissipation, free riding, and trade policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 795-803, April.
    10. Jung, Chulho & Krutilla, Kerry & Boyd, Roy, 1996. "Incentives for Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology at the Industry Level: An Evaluation of Policy Alternatives," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 95-111, January.
    11. Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
    12. Fredriksson, Per G., 1997. "The Political Economy of Pollution Taxes in a Small Open Economy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 44-58, May.
    13. Conrad Klaus, 1993. "Taxes and Subsidies for Pollution-Intensive Industries as Trade Policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 121-135, September.
    14. Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, 1995. "Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 97-118, Fall.
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    Cited by:

    1. Damania, Richard & Fredriksson, Per G. & List, John A., 2004. "The multiplier effect of globalization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 285-292, June.
    2. Fredriksson, Per G. & List, John A. & Millimet, Daniel L., 2003. "Bureaucratic corruption, environmental policy and inbound US FDI: theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1407-1430, August.
    3. Damania, Richard & Fredriksson, Per G. & List, John A., 2003. "Trade liberalization, corruption, and environmental policy formation: theory and evidence," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 490-512, November.
    4. Friehe, Tim & Langlais, Eric, 2015. "On the political economy of public safety investments," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 7-16.
    5. Fredriksson, Per G. & Mani, Muthukumara & Wollscheid, Jim R., 2006. "Environmental federalism : a panacea or Pandora's box for developing countries?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3847, The World Bank.
    6. Fredriksson, Per G. & Sterner, Thomas, 2005. "The political economy of refunded emissions payment programs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 113-119, April.
    7. Fredriksson, Per G. & Wollscheid, Jim R., 2008. "The political economy of investment: The case of pollution control technology," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 53-72, March.
    8. Tim Friehe, 2013. "The Role of Investment in Environmental Lobbying Contests," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(3), pages 337-352, November.
    9. Richard Damania, 2002. "Protectionist Lobbying and Strategic Investment," Centre for International Economic Studies Working Papers 2002-36, University of Adelaide, Centre for International Economic Studies.
    10. Fredriksson, Per G. & Vollebergh, Herman R. J. & Dijkgraaf, Elbert, 2004. "Corruption and energy efficiency in OECD countries: theory and evidence," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 207-231, March.
    11. Halkos, George E. & Tzeremes, Nickolaos G., 2014. "Public sector transparency and countries’ environmental performance: A nonparametric analysis," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 19-37.
    12. Mohr, Robert D., 2006. "Environmental performance standards and the adoption of technology," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 238-248, June.
    13. Barbier, Edward B. & Damania, Richard & Leonard, Daniel, 2005. "Corruption, trade and resource conversion," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 276-299, September.
    14. Anriquez, Gustavo, 2002. "Trade And The Environment: An Economic Literature Survey," Working Papers 28598, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    15. Fredriksson Per G & Mani Muthukumara, 2004. "Trade Integration and Political Turbulence: Environmental Policy Consequences," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(2), pages 1-28, February.
    16. Konrad, Kai A., 2017. "Large investors, regulatory taking and investor-state dispute settlement," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 341-353.
    17. Goodhue, Rachael E. & Gruere, Guillaume P. & Klonsky, Karen, 2002. "Public Preferences, Pressure Groups, And Public Policy Regarding Multifunctionality In Agriculture: Compatibility And Conflict," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19595, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    18. Per Fredriksson & Daniel Millimet, 2007. "Legislative Organization and Pollution Taxation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 217-242, April.
    19. Grey, F., 2017. "Corporate lobbying for environmental protection," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1732, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    20. Guttel, Ehud & Leshem, Shmuel, 2013. "Bargaining around cost–benefit standards," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 55-67.

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