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Why the Weak Win: The Strategic Role of Investment in Lobbying

  • Richard Damania

    (School of Economics, University of Adelaide)

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    Recent empirical work suggests that old er and less efficient industries are typically more successful at securing trade protection and income support. Similarly, environmentally damaging industries often lobby effectively for less stringent environmental regulations. This paper explains the lobbying success of these industries in terms of strategic role of investment as a credible commitment device.

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    File URL: http://www.economics.adelaide.edu.au/research/papers/doc/wp1998-09.pdf
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    Paper provided by University of Adelaide, School of Economics in its series School of Economics Working Papers with number 1998-09.

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    Length: 23 pages
    Date of creation: 1998
    Date of revision:
    Publication status: Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, July 2001, Volume 42, Issue 1, pp. 1-22 as "When the Weak Win: The Role of Investment in Environmental Lobbying"
    Handle: RePEc:adl:wpaper:1998-09
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Adelaide SA 5005
    Phone: (618) 8303 5540
    Web page: http://www.economics.adelaide.edu.au/

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    1. Conrad Klaus, 1993. "Taxes and Subsidies for Pollution-Intensive Industries as Trade Policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 121-135, September.
    2. Anderson, Kym, 1993. "Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and Poor Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 789, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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