Why the Weak Win: The Strategic Role of Investment in Lobbying
Recent empirical work suggests that old er and less efficient industries are typically more successful at securing trade protection and income support. Similarly, environmentally damaging industries often lobby effectively for less stringent environmental regulations. This paper explains the lobbying success of these industries in terms of strategic role of investment as a credible commitment device.
|Date of creation:||1998|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, July 2001, Volume 42, Issue 1, pp. 1-22 as "When the Weak Win: The Role of Investment in Environmental Lobbying"|
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Conrad Klaus, 1993. "Taxes and Subsidies for Pollution-Intensive Industries as Trade Policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 121-135, September.
- Anderson, Kym, 1993.
"Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and Poor Countries,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
789, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Anderson, Kym, 1995. "Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and Poor Countries," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 401-23, January.
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