A Political Economy Model of Health Insurance Policy
This paper aims to explain the divergent path of U.S. health policy from other high-income countries. The paper develops a general framework of interest group politics to study how the organization of industry can shape health insurance coverage and greater public involvement in health insurance. Large firms face a higher degree of unionization and provide more health coverage for employees than small firms. Consequently, large firms favor the adoption of a policy of universal health care coverage as a means of divesting health care costs to the public sector. Public aversion to higher taxation counterbalances this effect. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2010
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 38 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
Postal:Suite 650, International Tower, 229 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, GA 30303
Phone: (404) 965-1555
Fax: (404) 965-1556
Web page: http://www.iaes.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/11293/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994.
"Protection for Sale,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Persson, Torsten, 1998. "Economic Policy and Special Interest Politics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 310-327, March.
- Thomas C. Buchmueller & John DiNardo & Robert G. Valletta, 2000.
"Union effects on health insurance provision and coverage in the United States,"
Working Paper Series
2000-04, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
- Thomas C. Buchmueller & John Dinardo & Robert G. Valletta, 2002. "Union Effects on Health Insurance Provision and Coverage in the United States," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 55(4), pages 610-627, July.
- Thomas C. Buchmueller & John DiNardo, 2001. "Union Effects on Health Insurance Provision and Coverage in the United States," NBER Working Papers 8238, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Elizabeth Docteur & Howard Oxley, 2003.
"Health-Care Systems: Lessons from the Reform Experience,"
OECD Economics Department Working Papers
374, OECD Publishing.
- Elizabeth Docteur & Howard Oxley, 2003. "Health-Care Systems: Lessons from the Reform Experience," OECD Health Working Papers 9, OECD Publishing.
- Friedrich Breyer, 2001. "Income Redistribution and the Political Economy of Social Health Insurance: Comparing Germany and Switzerland," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 253, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:38:y:2010:i:1:p:23-36. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.