IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article

A Political Economy Model of Health Insurance Policy

  • Alena Kimakova

    ()

Registered author(s):

    This paper aims to explain the divergent path of U.S. health policy from other high-income countries. The paper develops a general framework of interest group politics to study how the organization of industry can shape health insurance coverage and greater public involvement in health insurance. Large firms face a higher degree of unionization and provide more health coverage for employees than small firms. Consequently, large firms favor the adoption of a policy of universal health care coverage as a means of divesting health care costs to the public sector. Public aversion to higher taxation counterbalances this effect. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2010

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11293-009-9200-z
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Article provided by International Atlantic Economic Society in its journal Atlantic Economic Journal.

    Volume (Year): 38 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 1 (March)
    Pages: 23-36

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:38:y:2010:i:1:p:23-36
    Contact details of provider: Postal:
    Suite 650, International Tower, 229 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, GA 30303

    Phone: (404) 965-1555
    Fax: (404) 965-1556
    Web page: http://springerlink.metapress.com/link.asp?id=112055
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Persson, Torsten, 1998. "Economic Policy and Special Interest Politics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 310-27, March.
    2. Thomas C. Buchmueller & John Dinardo & Robert G. Valletta, 2002. "Union Effects on Health Insurance Provision and Coverage in the United States," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 55(4), pages 610-627, July.
    3. Elizabeth Docteur & Howard Oxley, 2003. "Health-Care Systems: Lessons from the Reform Experience," OECD Health Working Papers 9, OECD Publishing.
    4. Friedrich Breyer, 2001. "Income Redistribution and the Political Economy of Social Health Insurance: Comparing Germany and Switzerland," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 253, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    5. Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:38:y:2010:i:1:p:23-36. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)

    or (Rebekah McClure)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.