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Political ownership

  • Bennedsen, Morten
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047-2727(99)00096-1
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

    Volume (Year): 76 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 3 (June)
    Pages: 559-581

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:76:y:2000:i:3:p:559-581
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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    1. Persson, Torsten, 1998. "Economic Policy and Special Interest Politics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 310-27, March.
    2. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025.
    3. Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "State Versus Private Ownership," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1841, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    4. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-69, August.
    5. E. Markou & C. Waddams Price, 1999. "UK utilities: Past reform and current proposals," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(3), pages 371-416, 09.
    6. Blanchard, O. & Aghion, P., 1996. "On insider privatization," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 759-766, April.
    7. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Privatization and Incentives," Working papers 572, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    8. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31.
    9. Patrick Bolton, 1995. "Privatization and the separation of ownership and control: lessons from Chinese enterprise reform," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 3(1), pages 1-11, 03.
    10. Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 265-286.
    12. Roman Frydman & Andrzej Rapaczynski, 1993. "Insiders and the state: overview of responses to agency problems in East European privatizations," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 1(1), pages 39-59, 01.
    13. Olivier Debande & Guido Friebel, 1997. "Privatization and Managerial Efficiency," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 39, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    14. Schmidt, Klaus M, 1996. "The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-24, April.
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