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Customer Ownership and Quality Provision in Public Services under Asymmetric Information

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  • Laura Abrardi
  • Luca Colombo
  • Pier Angelo Mori

Abstract

The implementation of projects producing external effects is often a source of disagreement and conflict between hosting and non-hosting communities.The paper focuses on the impact of participatory ownership on conflict resolution and social welfare in the presence of asymmetric information and imperfect quality monitoring. We show that in such situations the participatory solution may help solve Not-in-my-backyard (Nimby) crises and similar deadlocks that money transfers to a for-profit operator cannot solve. The analysis highlights two main factors behind this fact. First, a customer-owned cooperative internalizes, at least partially, the external effects generated by the project. Second, the alignment of cooperative members' preferences with those of the social planner reduces (in some cases eliminates) the distortions caused by information asymmetries.

Suggested Citation

  • Laura Abrardi & Luca Colombo & Pier Angelo Mori, 2014. "Customer Ownership and Quality Provision in Public Services under Asymmetric Information," Euricse Working Papers 1467, Euricse (European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises).
    • Handle: RePEc:trn:utwpeu:1467
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Citizen participation; customer-ownership; cooperative firm; public goods; privatization; Nimby syndrome.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • P13 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Cooperative Enterprises

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