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Market power and the form of enterprise: capitalist firms, worker-owned firms and consumer cooperatives

  • Mikami, Kazuhiko
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

    Volume (Year): 52 (2003)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 533-552

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:52:y:2003:i:4:p:533-552
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

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    1. Dow, Gregory K., 1986. "Control rights, competitive markets, and the labor management debate," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 48-61, March.
    2. Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    3. Hansmann, Henry, 1988. "Ownership of the Firm," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 267-304, Fall.
    4. Hart, Oliver D. & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Scholarly Articles 3448675, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    5. Dow, Gregory K, 1993. "Why Capital Hires Labor: A Bargaining Perspective," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 118-34, March.
    6. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Working papers 367, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    7. Bonin, John P & Jones, Derek C & Putterman, Louis, 1993. "Theoretical and Empirical Studies of Producer Cooperatives: Will Ever the Twain Meet?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 1290-320, September.
    8. Helmuth CREMER & Jacques CRÉMER, 1994. "Employee Control and Oligopoly in a Free Market Economy," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 33, pages 29-49.
    9. Ireland, Norman J. & Stewart, Geoff, 1995. "On the Sale of Production Rights and Firm Organization," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 289-307, December.
    10. Ben-Ner, Avner, 1988. "Comparative empirical observations on worker-owned and capitalist firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 7-31, March.
    11. Stewart, Geoff, 1984. "Labour-managed firms and monopsony power," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 63-74, March.
    12. Williamson, Oliver E, 1979. "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 233-61, October.
    13. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, June.
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