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Why capital suppliers (usually) hire workers: what we know and what we need to know

  • Dow, Gregory K.
  • Putterman, Louis

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8F-417NDK9-3/2/f7c4086cd7126a56b92134345ad0a5fc
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 43 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 319-336

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:43:y:2000:i:3:p:319-336
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

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  1. David Andolfatto & Ed Nosal, 1997. "Optimal Team Contracts," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(2), pages 385-96, May.
  2. Kennan, J. & Wilson, R., 1991. "Bargaining with Private Information," Working Papers 90-01rev, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  3. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1991. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," NBER Working Papers 3906, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Dow, G.L., 1999. "On the Neutrality of Asset Ownership for Work Incentives," Discussion Papers dp99-1, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
  5. Craig, Ben & Pencavel, John, 1992. "The Behavior of Worker Cooperatives: The Plywood Companies of the Pacific Northwest," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1083-105, December.
  6. Bentley MacLeod, 1986. "Behaviour and the Organization of the Firm," Working Papers 648, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  7. Michael Kremer, 1997. "Why are Worker Cooperatives So Rare?," NBER Working Papers 6118, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Douglas L. Kruse, 1993. "Profit Sharing: Does It Make a Difference?," Books from Upjohn Press, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number ps, June.
  10. Dow, Gregory K, 1993. "Why Capital Hires Labor: A Bargaining Perspective," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 118-34, March.
  11. Bonin, John P & Jones, Derek C & Putterman, Louis, 1993. "Theoretical and Empirical Studies of Producer Cooperatives: Will Ever the Twain Meet?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 1290-320, September.
  12. Hansmann, Henry, 1988. "Ownership of the Firm," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 267-304, Fall.
  13. Benham, Lee & Keefer, Philip, 1991. "Voting in Firms: The Role of Agenda Control, Size and Voter Homogeneity," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(4), pages 706-19, October.
  14. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  15. Gregory K. Dow & Gilbert L. Skillman, 2005. "Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms," Microeconomics 0509003, EconWPA.
  16. Wadhwani, S. & Wall, M., 1988. "The Effects Of Profit-Sharing On Employment, Wages, Stock Returns And Productivity: Evidence From Uk Micro-Data," Papers 311, London School of Economics - Centre for Labour Economics.
  17. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December.
  18. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1991. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /1991/233, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  19. Williamson, Oliver E, 1988. " Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(3), pages 567-91, July.
  20. Putterman, Louis, 1984. "On Some Recent Explanations of Why Capital Hires Labor," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 22(2), pages 171-87, April.
  21. Zusman, Pinhas, 1992. "Constitutional selection of collective-choice rules in a cooperative enterprise," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 353-362, May.
  22. Baker, George P & Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1988. " Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(3), pages 593-616, July.
  23. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December.
  24. Jones, Derek C & Kato, Takao, 1995. "The Productivity Effects of Employee Stock-Ownership Plans and Bonuses: Evidence from Japanese Panel Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 391-414, June.
  25. Lease, Ronald C. & McConnell, John J. & Mikkelson, Wayne H., 1983. "The market value of control in publicly-traded corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 439-471, April.
  26. Jensen, Michael C & Meckling, William H, 1979. "Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(4), pages 469-506, October.
  27. Gregory Dow, 1996. "Replicating Walrasian equilibria using markets for membership in labor-managed firms," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 147-162, December.
  28. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
  29. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817, March.
  30. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
  31. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  32. Dow, Gregory K., 1986. "Control rights, competitive markets, and the labor management debate," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 48-61, March.
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