Optimal Team Contracts
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- Spraggon, John, 2002.
"Exogenous targeting instruments as a solution to group moral hazards,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 427-456, June.
- John Spraggon, 1998. "Exogenous Targeting Instruments as a Solution to Group Moral Hazards," Department of Economics Working Papers 1998-01, McMaster University.
- Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001.
"Free-riding and Fairness in Principal-Multi-Agent Relationships: Experimental Evidence,"
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
- Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Free-riding and Fairness in Principal-Multi-Agent Relationships: Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-00151509, HAL.
- Dow, Gregory K. & Putterman, Louis, 2000. "Why capital suppliers (usually) hire workers: what we know and what we need to know," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 319-336, November.
- María Verónica Alderete, 2015. "Redes de pymes: una visión desde las teorías de club y de equipo," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 17(32), pages 317-348, January-J.
- Dow, Gregory K., 2000.
"On the Neutrality of Asset Ownership for Work Incentives,"
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 581-605, September.
- Dow, G.L., 1999. "On the Neutrality of Asset Ownership for Work Incentives," Discussion Papers dp99-1, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
- Gustavo Ferro & Omar Chisari, 2010.
"Tópicos de Economía de la Regulación de los Servicios Públicos,"
- Chisari, Omar & Ferro, Gustavo, 2011. "Tópicos de Economía de la Regulación de los Servicios Públicos," UADE Textos de Discusión 65_2011, Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa.
- Huddart, Steven & Liang, Pierre Jinghong, 2005. "Profit sharing and monitoring in partnerships," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-3), pages 153-187, December.
- Madanmohan Ghosh & Carlo Perroni & John Whalley, 1999. "The Value of MFN Treatment to Developing Countries," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9916, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
- Fosco, C. & Mengel, F., 2008. "Incentives and informal networks," Research Memorandum 022, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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