Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms
Because contracts among input suppliers are incomplete, it is necessary to assign rights to determine the policies of the firm. Two leading contenders for such control rights are investors and workers. Large enterprises are generally controlled by capital suppliers or their agents. We trace this pattern to an underlying asymmetry in the characteristics of capital and labor.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada|
Web page: http://www.sfu.ca/economics.html
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: Working Paper Coordinator, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada|
Web: http://www.sfu.ca/economics/research/publications.html Email:
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dreze, Jacques H & Hagen, Kare P, 1978. "Choice of Product Quality: Equilibrium and Efficiency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(3), pages 493-513, May.
- Kramer, Gerald H, 1973. "On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(2), pages 285-297, March.
- Oliver D. Hart, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differentiated Commodities," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-30.
- Chris Doucouliagos, 1995. "Worker Participation and Productivity in Labor-Managed and Participatory Capitalist Firms: A Meta-Analysis," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 49(1), pages 58-77, October.
- Hart, Oliver D, 1979. "On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1057-1083, September.
- Gregory Dow, 1996. "Replicating Walrasian equilibria using markets for membership in labor-managed firms," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 147-162, December.
- Louis Makowski, 1983. "Competitive Stock Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 305-330.
- Dow,Gregory K., 2003.
"Governing the Firm,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521818537, December.
- Dow,Gregory K., 2003. "Governing the Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521522212, December.
- Michael Magill & Martine Quinzii, 2002. "Theory of Incomplete Markets, Volume 1," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262632543.
- Sadanand, Asha B & Williamson, John M, 1991. "Equilibrium in a Stock Market Economy with Shareholder Voting," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(1), pages 1-35, February.
- Dow, Gregory K., 1986. "Control rights, competitive markets, and the labor management debate," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 48-61, March.
- McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
- Makowski, Louis & Pepall, Lynne, 1985. " Easy Proofs of Unanimity and Optimality without Spanning: A Pedagogical Note," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1245-1250, September. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)