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Gilbert L. Skillman

Personal Details

First Name:Gilbert
Middle Name:L.
Last Name:Skillman
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:psk87
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Economics Department
Wesleyan University

Middletown, Connecticut (United States)
http://www.wesleyan.edu/econ/

: (860)685-2340
(860)685-2781
PAC 123, 238 Church Street, Middletown, CT 06459-0007
RePEc:edi:edwesus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Joyce P. Jacobsen & Gilbert L. Skillman, 2012. "Neoclassical Models of Imperfectly Competitive Labor Markets," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2012-007, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
  2. Dow, G.K. & Skillman, G.L., 1998. "Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms," Discussion Papers dp98-08, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.

Articles

  1. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2013. "The Puzzle of Marx's Missing "Results": A Tale of Two Theories," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 45(3), pages 475-504, Fall.
  2. Joyce P Jacobsen & Gilbert L Skillman, 2009. "35th Anniversary Issue of the Eastern Economic Journal," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 35(1), pages 1-1.
  3. Gregory K. Dow & Gilbert L. Skillman, 2007. "Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(1), pages 107-125, February.
  4. Skillman, Gilbert L., 1995. "Ne Hic Saltaveris: The Marxian Theory of Exploitation After Roemer," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(02), pages 309-331, October.
  5. Putterman Louis & Skillman Gilbert L., 1993. "Collectivization and China's Agricultural Crisis," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 530-539, June.
  6. Putterman, Louis & Skillman, Gilbert L., 1992. "The role of exit costs in the theory of cooperative teams," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 596-618, December.
  7. Skillman, Gil, 1989. "The insider-outsider theory of employment and unemployment : Assar Lindbeck and Dennis J. Snower, (The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988) pp. xii+285, $27.50," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 365-369, December.
  8. Putterman, Louis & Skillman, Gil Jr., 1988. "The incentive effects of monitoring under alternative compensation schemes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 109-119, March.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Dow, G.K. & Skillman, G.L., 1998. "Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms," Discussion Papers dp98-08, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.

    Cited by:

    1. Natália Monteiro & Geoff Stewart, 2015. "Scale, Scope and Survival: A Comparison of Cooperative and Capitalist Modes of Production," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 47(1), pages 91-118, August.
    2. Giuseppe Danese & Luigi Mittone, 2015. "Trust and trustworthiness in experimental organizations," CEEL Working Papers 1501, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    3. Gregory K. Dow, 2000. "Allocating Control Over Firms: Stock Markets Versus Membership Markets," Discussion Papers dp00-03, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, revised Feb 2000.
    4. Dow, Gregory K. & Putterman, Louis, 2000. "Why capital suppliers (usually) hire workers: what we know and what we need to know," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 319-336, November.
    5. Gregory K. DOW, 2018. "The Theory Of The Labor-Managed Firm: Past, Present, And Future," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(1), pages 65-86, March.
    6. David Kelsey & Frank Milne, 2010. "Takeovers and cooperatives: governance and stability in non-corporate firms," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 99(3), pages 193-209, April.

Articles

  1. Gregory K. Dow & Gilbert L. Skillman, 2007. "Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(1), pages 107-125, February.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Skillman, Gilbert L., 1995. "Ne Hic Saltaveris: The Marxian Theory of Exploitation After Roemer," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(02), pages 309-331, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Yoshihara, Naoki, 2010. "Class and exploitation in general convex cone economies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 281-296, August.
    2. Yoshihara, Naoki & Veneziani, Roberto, 2009. "Exploitation as the Unequal Exchange of Labour: An Axiomatic Approach," CCES Discussion Paper Series 23, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    3. Cogliano, Jonathan F. & Veneziani, Roberto & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2014. "The Dynamics of Exploitation and Class in Accumulation Economies," Discussion Paper Series 621, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    4. Roberto Veneziani, 2013. "Exploitation, inequality and power," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(4), pages 526-545, October.
    5. Veneziani, Roberto & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2014. "One million miles to go: taking the axiomatic road to defining exploitation," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2014-10, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    6. Jonathan F. Cogliano, 2017. "Surplus Value Production and Realization in Marxian Theory - Applications to the U.S., 1987-2015," Working Paper Series 2017-01, Dickinson College, Department of Economics.
    7. Jonathan F. Cogliano & Roberto Veneziani, 2018. "Exploitation, skills, and inequality," Working Papers 849, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    8. Veneziani, Roberto, 2007. "Exploitation and time," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 189-207, January.
    9. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2017. "Marx’s Capital through the lens of Roemer’s General Theory (and vice-versa)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(3), pages 423-443, December.
    10. Veneziani, Roberto & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Unequal Exchange, Assets, and Power: Recent Developments in Exploitation Theory," Discussion Paper Series 594, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.

  3. Putterman Louis & Skillman Gilbert L., 1993. "Collectivization and China's Agricultural Crisis," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 530-539, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Hui & Riedinger, Jeffrey & Jin, Songqing, 2015. "Land documents, tenure security and land rental development: Panel evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 220-235.
    2. Riskin, Carl, 1998. "Seven questions about the Chinese famine of 1959-1961," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 111-124.
    3. An, Mark Yuying & Li, Wei & Yang, Dennis Tao, 2001. "China's Great Leap: Forward or Backward? Anatomy of a Central Planning Disaster," CEPR Discussion Papers 2824, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Jin, Songqing & Deininger, Klaus W., 2007. "Land Rental Markets in the Process of Rural Structural Transformation: Productivity and Equity Impacts from China," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon TN 9932, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    5. Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing, 2009. "Securing property rights in transition: Lessons from implementation of China's rural land contracting law," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 22-38, May.
    6. Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing & Xia, Fang, 2012. "Moving off the farm: Land institutions to facilitate structural transformation and agricultural productivity growth in China," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5949, The World Bank.
    7. Charness, Gary & Yang, Chun-Lei, 2014. "Starting small toward voluntary formation of efficient large groups in public goods provision," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 119-132.
    8. Lin, Justin Yifu & Yang, Dennis Tao, 1998. "On the causes of China's agricultural crisis and the great leap famine," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 125-140.
    9. Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing, 2007. "Land rental markets in the process of rural structural transformation : productivity and equity impacts in China," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4454, The World Bank.

  4. Putterman, Louis & Skillman, Gilbert L., 1992. "The role of exit costs in the theory of cooperative teams," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 596-618, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2010. "The case for the virtual strike," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 9(1), pages 75-75, April.
    2. Deininger, Klaus, 1995. "Collective agricultural production: A solution for transition economies?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 23(8), pages 1317-1334, August.
    3. Gaudeul, Alexia & Crosetto, Paolo & Riener, Gerhard, 2017. "Better stuck together or free to go? Of the stability of cooperation when individuals have outside options," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 99-112.
    4. Riskin, Carl, 1998. "Seven questions about the Chinese famine of 1959-1961," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 111-124.
    5. Grosskopf Ofer & Medina Barak, 2007. "Rationalizing Drennan: On Irrevocable Offers, Bid Shopping and Binding Range," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(2), pages 321-361, August.
    6. Dow, Gregory K., 2000. "On the Neutrality of Asset Ownership for Work Incentives," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 581-605, September.
    7. Alexia Gaudeul & Paolo Crosetto & Gerhard Riener, 2015. "Of the stability of partnerships when individuals have outside options, or why allowing exit is inefficient," Jena Economic Research Papers 2015-001, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    8. Alexia Gaudeul & Paolo Crosetto & Gerhard Riener, 2014. "Fear of being left alone drives inefficient exit from partnerships. An experiment," Jena Economic Research Papers 2014-012, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    9. Bai, Chong-En & Xu, Cheng-Gang, 2001. "Ownership, incentives and monitoring," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3750, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    10. Dong, Xiao-yuan & Putterman, Louis, 1997. "Productivity and Organization in China's Rural Industries: A Stochastic Frontier Analysis," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 181-201, April.
    11. Gregory K. DOW, 2018. "The Theory Of The Labor-Managed Firm: Past, Present, And Future," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(1), pages 65-86, March.
    12. Chong-en Bai & Chenggang Xu, 1995. "Does Employee Ownership Improve Incentives for Efforts," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 303., Boston College Department of Economics.
    13. Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2009. "The Case for the Virtual Strike. An Appraisal of the Italian Proposal," Department of Economics University of Siena 557, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    14. Claudia Keser & Claude Montmarquette, 2011. "Voluntary versus Enforced Team Effort," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 2(3), pages 1-25, August.

  5. Skillman, Gil, 1989. "The insider-outsider theory of employment and unemployment : Assar Lindbeck and Dennis J. Snower, (The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988) pp. xii+285, $27.50," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 365-369, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Marco Guerrazzi, 2010. "Nominal Wage Indexation, Quasi-Equilibria And Real Wage Dynamics," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(3), pages 279-294, July.
    2. Víctor Manuel Montuenga Gómez & Andrés E. Romeu Santana & Melchor Fernández Fernández, 2000. "Diferencias salariales y comportamiento no competitivo en el mercado de trabajo en la industria española," Documentos de trabajo - Analise Economica 0009, IDEGA - Instituto Universitario de Estudios e Desenvolvemento de Galicia.

  6. Putterman, Louis & Skillman, Gil Jr., 1988. "The incentive effects of monitoring under alternative compensation schemes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 109-119, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Li, Shuhe & Zhang, Weiying, 2001. "Optimal assignment of principalship in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 105-127, January.
    2. Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Somville, Vincent & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2014. "Elite capture through information distortion: A theoretical essay," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 250-263.
    3. Douglas L. Kruse, 1993. "Does Profit Sharing Affect Productivity?," NBER Working Papers 4542, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Joseph R. Blasi & Douglas L. Kruse & Richard B. Freeman, 2010. "Epilogue (and Prologue)," NBER Chapters,in: Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options, pages 377-386 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Ugarte, Armando & Oren, Shmuel, 2000. "Coordination of internal supply chains in vertically integrated high-tech manufacturing organizations (HTMOs)," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 235-252, October.
    6. Zou, Liang, 1992. "Ownership structure and efficiency: An incentive mechanism approach," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 399-431, September.
    7. Julia Lane & Robert Feinberg & Harry Broadman, 2002. "Do Labour Strategies Matter? An Analysis of Two Enterprise-Level Data Sets in China," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(2), pages 225-237.
    8. Douglas L. Kruse & Joseph R. Blasi & Rhokeun Park, 2008. "Shared Capitalism in the U.S. Economy? Prevalence, Characteristics, and Employee Views of Financial Participation in Enterprises," NBER Working Papers 14225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

More information

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 2 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2005-09-17
  2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2005-09-17
  3. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (1) 2013-07-05

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