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Ownership, Incentives and Monitoring

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  • Chong-En Bai
  • Chenggang Xu

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of ownership structure on workers' incentives for investing in firm-specific human capital. Particularly, we analyse such incentivers and monitoring under employee ownership and capitalist ownership. In our model, the employee-owned firm is a firm bought by its workers who pay the competitive price. Under certain conditions, we show that the workers' investment and expected income are higher and the monitoring intensity is lower in an employee-owned firm than they are in a capitalist firm. We also show that the incentive effect of employee ownership increases as a worker's reservation wage decreases, as the monitoring cost or as the productivity uncertainty increases. Most of our results are consistent with the available empirical evidence

Suggested Citation

  • Chong-En Bai & Chenggang Xu, 2001. "Ownership, Incentives and Monitoring," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 413, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  • Handle: RePEc:cep:stitep:413
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Belloc, Filippo, 2017. "What deters labor-owned firm creation? Evidence from Italian manufacturing sectors," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 139-153.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Employee ownership; monitoring; incentives; property rights;

    JEL classification:

    • J54 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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