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Behavior and the organization of the firm


  • Macleod, Bentley


In this paper a new way of distinguishing between cooperative and non-cooperative organizations is introduced. This distinction is based on well-known solution concepts and is applied to the problem of organizing production teams in a firm. Our first results demonstrates that income-sharing cooperative firms are not necessarily inefficient as suggested in the work of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Holmstrom (1982). Secondly, it is shown that if a capitalist firm is interpreted as a non-cooperative organization, then it must be less efficient than corresponding cooperative organizations due to the additional monitoring of workers needed to stop shirking.
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  • Macleod, Bentley, 1987. "Behavior and the organization of the firm," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 207-220, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:11:y:1987:i:2:p:207-220

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Feltenstein, Andrew & Lebow, David & van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 1990. "Savings, Commodity Market Rationing, and the Real Rate of Interest in China," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 22(2), pages 234-252, May.
    2. Richard Portes, 1986. "The Theory and Measurement of Macroeconomic Disequilibrium in Centrally Planned Economies," NBER Working Papers 1875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Feltenstein, Andrew & Farhadian, Ziba, 1987. "Fiscal Policy, Monetary Targets, and the Price Level in a Centrally Planned Economy: An Application to the Case of China," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(2), pages 137-156, May.
    4. Chow, Gregory C, 1985. "A Model of Chinese National Income Determination," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 782-792, August.
    5. Spanos,Aris, 1986. "Statistical Foundations of Econometric Modelling," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521269124, March.
    6. Hwang, Hae-shin, 1985. "Test of the Adjustment Process and Linear Homogeneity in a Stock Adjustment Model of Money Demand," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 67(4), pages 689-692, November.
    7. Portes, Richard & Winter, David, 1978. "The Demand for Money and for Consumption Goods in Centrally Planned Economies," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(1), pages 8-18, February.
    8. Richard Portes & David Winter, 1980. "Disequilibrium Estimates for Consumption Goods Markets in Centrally Planned Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 137-159.
    9. Granger, C W J, 1969. "Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-Spectral Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 37(3), pages 424-438, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dow, Gregory K. & Putterman, Louis, 2000. "Why capital suppliers (usually) hire workers: what we know and what we need to know," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 319-336, November.
    2. Zou, Liang, 1992. "Ownership structure and efficiency: An incentive mechanism approach," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 399-431, September.
    3. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2013. "On Economics: A Review of Why Nations Fail by D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson and Pillars of Prosperity by T. Besley and T. Persson," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 116-143, March.
    4. Casey Ichniowski & Kathryn L. Shaw, 2009. "Connective Capital as Social Capital: The Value of Problem-Solving Networks for Team Players in Firms," NBER Working Papers 15619, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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