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Non-contractible investments and vertical integration in the Mexican footwear industry

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  • Woodruff, Christopher

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  • Woodruff, Christopher, 2002. "Non-contractible investments and vertical integration in the Mexican footwear industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(8), pages 1197-1224, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:20:y:2002:i:8:p:1197-1224
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