Outsourcing, Market Structure and Elections
We make a positive analysis of the impact of market structure and political preferences on a (local) government's decision to outsource public service using the framework of Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997). We argue that although outsourcing is more attractive when the privte market is competitive, the outsourcing decision will be the same in a competitive as in a monopolistic market. Second, we analyze how the price paid in a private monopoly market depends on how much the government cares about the benefits of the public service, and we provide conditions for when a "leftist, public service loving" politician outsources to a lower price. When this is the case and outsourcing is a salient issue in an election, the median voter prefers a more "leftist" government to be in charge of the outsourcing.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2003|
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