Privatization, investment, and ownership efficiency
We provide a model that explains the following empirical observations: (i) private ownership is more efficient than public ownership, (ii) privatizations are associated with increases in efficiency, and (iii) the increase in efficiency predates the privatization. The two key mechanisms explaining the results are: (i) a government owner keeping control can affect long-run employment levels when investing and (ii) a privatizing government has a stronger incentive to invest than an acquiring firm: the government exploits the fact that investments increase the sales price not only due to the increase in the acquirer's profit, but also due to a reduced profit for the non-acquirer. Copyright 2012 Oxford University Press 2011 All rights reserved, Oxford University Press.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 64 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK|
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://oep.oupjournals.org/
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pehr-Johan Norbäck & Lars Persson, 2009.
"The Organization of the Innovation Industry: Entrepreneurs, Venture Capitalists, and Oligopolists,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 7(6), pages 1261-1290, December.
- Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars, 2004. "The Organization of the Innovation Industry: Entrepreneurs, Venture Capitalists, and Oligopolists," Working Paper Series 626, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars, 2009. "The Organization of the Innovation Industry: Entrepreneurs, Venture Capitalists and Oligopolists," Working Paper Series 783, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars, 2006. "The Organization of the Innovation Industry: Entrepreneurs, Venture Capitalists and Oligopolists," CEPR Discussion Papers 5449, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bernardo Bortolotti & Marcella Fantini & Domenico Siniscalco, 2001. "Privatisation Around the World: New Evidence from Panel Data," CESifo Working Paper Series 600, CESifo Group Munich.
- Simeon Djankov & Gerhard Pohl, 1997. "Restructuring of Large Firms in Slovakia," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 73, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Roland, Gerard & Sekkat, Khalid, 2000. "Managerial career concerns, privatization and restructuring in transition economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(10), pages 1857-1872, December.
- Roland, Gérard & Sekkat, Khalid, 1996. "Managerial Career Concerns, Privatization and Restructuring in Transition Economies," CEPR Discussion Papers 1363, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gérard Roland & Khalid Sekkat, 2000. "Managerial career concerns, privatization and restructuring in transition economies," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7340, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Florencio López-de-Silanes, 1997. "Determinants of Privatization Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 965-1025.
- Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, 1996. "Determinants of Privatization Prices," NBER Working Papers 5494, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bennedsen, Morten, 2000. "Political ownership," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 559-581, June.
- Bruno Biais & Enrico Perotti, 2002. "Machiavellian Privatization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 240-258, March.
- Jeffry M. Netter & William L. Megginson, 2001. "From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 321-389, June.
- Bennett, John & Maw, James, 2000. "Privatisation and market structure in a transition economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 357-382, September.
- John Bennett & James Maw, 1998. "Privatisation and Market Structure in a Transition Economy," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 175, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- S. Baranzoni & P. Bianchi & L. Lambertini, 2000. "Multiproduct Firms, Product Differentiation, and Market Structure," Working Papers 368, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:64:y:2012:i:4:p:765-786. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.