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Privatisation and Market Structure in a Transition Economy

Author

Listed:
  • John Bennett
  • James Maw

Abstract

A model is developed in which an industry of N > I firms is privatized. The 'participation' method of privatization is used, whereby firms are sold for cash, but the state retains a proportionate share of ownership. In each firm the new private owner has the opportunity to make a reorganisational investment, before output Is produced. The investment is unobservable by the state, and therefore noncontractible. Thae Is Cournot competition In the product market. The welfare-maximizing retained ownership share for the state is analyzed; taking into account that potential buyers of firms may have limited access to finance.

Suggested Citation

  • John Bennett & James Maw, 1998. "Privatisation and Market Structure in a Transition Economy," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 175, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    • Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:1998-175
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    Cited by:

    1. Shih-Jye Wu & Yang-Ming Chang & Hung-Yi Chen, 2016. "Imported inputs and privatization in downstream mixed oligopoly with foreign ownership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 49(3), pages 1179-1207, August.
    2. Wang, Leonard F.S. & Chen, Tai-Liang, 2011. "Mixed oligopoly, optimal privatization, and foreign penetration," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 1465-1470, July.
    3. Guriev, Sergei & Makarov, Igor & Maurel, Mathilde, 2002. "Debt Overhang and Barter in Russia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 635-656, December.
    4. Hsu, Su-Ying & Lo, Chu-Ping & Wu, Shih-Jye, 2014. "The nexus of market concentration and privatization policy in mixed oligopoly," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 196-203.
    5. Maw, James, 2002. "Partial privatization in transition economies," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 271-282, September.
    6. Chen, Chien-Hsun & Mai, Chao-Cheng & Liu, Yu-Lin & Mai, Shin-Ying, 2009. "Privatization and optimal share release in the Chinese banking industry," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1161-1171, November.
    7. Pehr-Johan Norbäck & Lars Persson, 2012. "Privatization, investment, and ownership efficiency," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(4), pages 765-786, October.
    8. Walsh, Patrick Paul & Whelan, Ciara, 2001. "Firm performance and the political economy of corporate governance: survey evidence for Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 85-112, June.
    9. Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars, 2003. "Privatization and Restructuring in Concentrated Markets," Working Paper Series 605, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    10. Bennett, John & Maw, James, 2003. "Privatization, partial state ownership, and competition," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 58-74, March.
    11. John Bennett & James Maw, 2019. "Bargaining externalities in a privatization programme," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 27(2), pages 447-455, February.
    12. Arghya Ghosh & Manipushpak Mitra & Bibhas Saha, 2015. "Privatization, Underpricing, and Welfare in the Presence of Foreign Competition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(3), pages 433-460, June.
    13. Bibhas Saha, 2009. "Mixed ownership in a mixed duopoly with differentiated products," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 98(1), pages 25-43, September.

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