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Privatisation and market structure in a transition economy

  • Bennett, John
  • Maw, James

A model is developed in which an industry of N > I firms is privatized. The 'participation' method of privatization is used, whereby firms are sold for cash, but the state retains a proportionate share of ownership. In each firm the new private owner has the opportunity to make a reorganisational investment, before output Is produced. The investment is unobservable by the state, and therefore noncontractible. Thae Is Cournot competition In the product market. The welfare-maximizing retained ownership share for the state is analyzed; taking into account that potential buyers of firms may have limited access to finance.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 77 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 357-382

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:77:y:2000:i:3:p:357-382
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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  1. Mathias Dewatripont & Gérard Roland, 1996. "Transition as a process of large-scale institutional change," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 4(1), pages 1-30, 05.
  2. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December.
  3. Grosfeld, I. & Roland, G., 1995. "Defensive and Strategic Restructuring in Central European Enterprises," DELTA Working Papers 95-18, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  4. Demougin, Dominique & Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1994. "Privatization, risk-taking, and the communist firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 203-231, October.
  5. Susan J Linz & Gary Krueger, 1998. "Enterprise Restructuring in Russia's Transition Economy: Formal and Informal Mechanisms," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 40(2), pages 5-52, July.
  6. Hans-Werner Sinn & Alfons J. Weichenrieder, 1997. "Foreign direct investment, political resentment and the privatization process in eastern Europe," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 12(24), pages 177-210, 04.
  7. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen.
  8. Blanchard, Olivier Jean, 1994. "Transition in Poland," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(426), pages 1169-77, September.
  9. Marc Duponcel, 1998. "Restructuring of food industries in the five Central and Eastern European front-runners towards EU membership (CEEC-5). A comparative review," CERT Discussion Papers 9806, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University.
  10. Greg Shaffer & Stephen W. Salant, 1999. "Unequal Treatment of Identical Agents in Cournot Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 585-604, June.
  11. Estrin, Saul & Hare, Paul G, 1999. "Output and Exports in Transition Economies: A Labour Management Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 2080, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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