IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/4205.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Privatization, Risk-Taking, and the Communist Firm

Author

Listed:
  • Dominique Demougin
  • Hans-Werner Sinn

Abstract

This paper studies alternative methods of privatizing a formerly communist firm in the presence of imperfect risk markets. The methods include cash sales, a give-away scheme, and a participation contract where the government retains a sleeping fractional ownership in the firm. It is shown that, with competitive bidding, the participation contract dominates cash sales because it generates both more private restructuring investment and a higher expected present value of revenue for the government. Under weak conditions, the participation contract will induce more investment than the giveaway scheme, and it may even share the cash sales' virtue of incentive compatibility.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Demougin & Hans-Werner Sinn, 1992. "Privatization, Risk-Taking, and the Communist Firm," NBER Working Papers 4205, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4205
    Note: PE
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w4205.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1974. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 219-255.
    2. Ahsan, Syed M, 1974. "Progression and Risk-Taking," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(3), pages 318-328, November.
    3. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
    4. Bulow, Jeremy I & Summers, Lawrence H, 1984. "The Taxation of Risky Assets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(1), pages 20-39, February.
    5. Meyer, Jack, 1987. "Two-moment Decision Models and Expected Utility Maximization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 421-430, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hans-Werner Sinn & Alfons J. Weichenrieder, 1997. "Foreign direct investment, political resentment and the privatization process in eastern Europe," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 12(24), pages 177-210, April.
    2. Walsh, Patrick Paul & Whelan, Ciara, 2001. "Firm performance and the political economy of corporate governance: survey evidence for Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 85-112, June.
    3. Bennett, John & Estrin, Saul & Maw, James, 2007. "The choice of privatization method in a transition economy when insiders control a firm," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 806-819, September.
    4. Banerji, Sanjay & Errunza, Vihang R., 2005. "Privatization under incomplete information and bankruptcy risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 735-757, March.
    5. repec:oup:ecpoli:v:12:y:1997:i:24:p:177-210 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Bennett, John & Maw, James, 2000. "Privatisation and market structure in a transition economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 357-382, September.
    7. Bodó, Péter, 1996. "Az ügynökprobléma néhány aspektusa az átmeneti gazdaságban [Some aspects of the agent problem in the transition economy]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(4), pages 342-349.
    8. Pennings, Enrico, 2008. "Privatization of real options," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 489-497, September.
    9. Maw, James, 2002. "Partial privatization in transition economies," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 271-282, September.
    10. Chen, Chien-Hsun & Mai, Chao-Cheng & Liu, Yu-Lin & Mai, Shin-Ying, 2009. "Privatization and optimal share release in the Chinese banking industry," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1161-1171, November.
    11. Sinn, Hans-Werner & Weichenrieder, Alfons J., 1997. "Foreign direct investment, political resentment and the privatization process in eastern Europe," Munich Reprints in Economics 19562, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    12. Bennett, John & Maw, James, 2003. "Privatization, partial state ownership, and competition," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 58-74, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Konrad, Kai A., 1989. "Kapitaleinkommensteuern und beschleunigte Abschreibungen bei Unsicherheit," EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 404-427.
    2. Roussey, Ludivine & Soubeyran, Raphael, 2018. "Overburdened judges," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 21-32.
    3. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2018. "Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I, chapter 16, pages 453-485, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Syed M. Ahsan & Panagiotis Tsigaris, 2009. "The Efficiency Loss of Capital Income Taxation under Imperfect Loss Offset Provisions," Public Finance Review, , vol. 37(6), pages 710-731, November.
    5. repec:eee:labchp:v:2:y:1986:i:c:p:789-848 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March.
    7. Hlouskova, Jaroslava & Tsigaris, Panagiotis, 2020. "Capital income taxation under full loss offset provisions of a prospect theory investor," IHS Working Paper Series 11, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    8. Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1987. "Le risque moral dans la relation de mandat," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 38(1), pages 5-24.
    9. Ng, Yew-Kwang & Shi, He-ling, 1995. "Work quality and optimal pay structure: Piece vs. hourly rates in employee remuneration," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(3-4), pages 409-416, March.
    10. Gaarder, Marie M. & Bartsch, Ulrich, 2014. "The second wave of independence : shopping for solutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7069, The World Bank.
    11. Niemann, Rainer, 2007. "Risikoübernahme, Arbeitsanreiz und differenzierende Besteuerung," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 28, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    12. Kim, Son Ku & Wang, Susheng, 1998. "Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 342-378, October.
    13. Sokolovskyi, Dmytro, 2017. "Gaming modeling of self-enforcing agreements and free-rider problem," MPRA Paper 80818, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Aggarwal, Rimjhim M., 2007. "Role of risk sharing and transaction costs in contract choice: Theory and evidence from groundwater contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 475-496, July.
    15. Konrad, Kai A., 1991. "The Domar-Musgrave phenomenon and adverse selection," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 41-53, April.
    16. Fernandez-Olmos, Marta & Rosell-Martinez, Jorge & Espitia-Escuer, Manuel Antonio, 2008. "Double Sided Moral Hazard and Share Contracts in agriculture," 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium 43863, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    17. Sokolovskyi Dmytro B., 2013. "Modelling "Horizontal" Interaction of Economic Agents with the Help of a Collection of Games," Business Inform, RESEARCH CENTRE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS of NAS (KHARKIV, UKRAINE), Kharkiv National University of Economics, issue 9, pages 90-94.
    18. Graff Zivin, Joshua & Small, Arthur A., 2003. "Risk sharing in Coasean contracts," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(2, Supple), pages 394-415, March.
    19. H Peyton Young, 2014. "The Evolution of Social Norms," Economics Series Working Papers 726, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    20. Thomas Eichner & Andreas Wagener, 2002. "Increases in Risk and the Welfare State," CESifo Working Paper Series 685, CESifo.
    21. Li, Chenguang & Sexton, Richard J., 2009. "Impacts of Retailers’ Pricing Strategies for Produce Commodities on Farmer Welfare," 2009 Conference, August 16-22, 2009, Beijing, China 51720, International Association of Agricultural Economists.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • P13 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Cooperative Enterprises

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4205. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.