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Risikoübernahme, Arbeitsanreiz und differenzierende Besteuerung

  • Niemann, Rainer
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    In diesem Beitrag werden die Effekte symmetrischer und differenzierender Besteuerung auf die Portfoliowahl und den Arbeitsanreiz untersucht. Hierbei wird zunächst ein Portfoliomodell mit zwei riskanten Projekten im Ein-Personen-Kontext, d.h. ohne Arbeitsanreizproblem betrachtet. Symmetrische Besteuerung erhöht stets den Anteil des riskanteren Projekts im Vergleich zum steuerfreien Fall. Eine Bemessungsgrundlagenbegünstigung des riskanteren Projekts erhöht dessen Anteil nochmals. Die Wirkung einer Tarifbegünstigung riskanter Projekte jedoch ist uneindeutig. In einem weiteren Schritt wird symmetrische Besteuerung in ein Moral-Hazard-Modell des LEN-Typs integriert, wobei keine Möglichkeit der Portfoliowahl besteht. Die Unternehmensbesteuerung verringert die finanzielle Zielerreichung des Prinzipals proportional, hat aber keinen Einfluß auf den Vertragsabschluß. Die individuelle Einkommensbesteuerung des Agenten reduziert seinen Arbeitseinsatz proportional und kann ein Zustandekommen des Vertrages verhindern. Als Synthese der beiden Grundmodelle wird die simultane Portfoliowahl- und Arbeitseinsatzentscheidung im LEN-Modell analysiert. In diesem Modell delegiert der Prinzipal die Portfoliowahl an den Agenten. Dabei weist symmetrische Besteuerung keinen Einfluß auf die optimalen Portfoliogewichte auf. Die persönliche Einkommensteuer des Agenten reduziert seinen optimalen Arbeitseinsatz proportional; die Einkommensteuer des Prinzipals hat darauf keinen Einfluß. Die Agency-Kosten werden proportional um die Einkommensteuersätze von Prinzipal und Agent reduziert. Insofern wirkt symmetrische Besteuerung effizienzsteigernd. Es ist jedoch möglich, daß die Einkommensbesteuerung des Agenten ein Zustandekommen des Vertrags verhindert. Während eine Steuerbemessungsgrundlagenbegünstigung riskanter Projekte einen erhöhten optimalen Anteil des risikoreichen Projekts bewirkt, sind die Portfoliowirkungen einer Tarifbegünstigung riskanter Projekte uneindeutig: Für schwach risikoaverse Agenten bewirkt eine Tarifbegünstigung einen gestiegenen Anteil des risikoreichen Projekts; im Fall ausgeprägt risikoscheuer Agenten dagegen sinkt der risikoreich investierte Anteil. Diese Ergebnisse weisen auch Implikationen für steuerliche Fördermaßnahmen und internationale Standortentscheidungen auf. Eine zielgenaue Projekt- bzw. Standortförderung ist nur durch Bemessungsgrundlagenbegünstigung möglich, nicht dagegen durch Tarifbegünstigung. Mit der einseitigen Senkung des Nominalsteuersatzes kann ein Staat nicht notwendigerweise mehr Steuersubstrat attrahieren, da die Steigerung der erwarteten Nettorückflüsse durch eine Steigerung des Nach-Steuer-Risikos (über-)kompensiert werden kann.

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    Paper provided by arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre in its series arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research with number 28.

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    Date of creation: 2007
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:arqudp:28
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