Empire building by corporate managers:: the corporation as a savings instrument
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Rainer Niemann, 2011. "Asymmetric Taxation and Performance-Based Incentive Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 3363, CESifo Group Munich.
- Zivin, Joshua Graff & Just, Richard E. & Zilberman, David, 2005. "Risk Aversion, Liability Rules, and Safety," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 604-623, December.
- repec:eee:advacc:v:35:y:2016:i:c:p:159-169 is not listed on IDEAS
- Ana Pinto Borges & João Correia‐Da‐Silva, 2011. "Using Cost Observation To Regulate A Manager Who Has A Preference For Empire‐Building," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 79(1), pages 29-44, January.
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- Timothy King & Jonathan Williams, 2013. "Bank Efficiency and Executive Compensation," Working Papers 13009, Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales).
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"Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information,"
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- repec:rnp:ecopol:ep1709 is not listed on IDEAS
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