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Steuern in Agency-Modellen: Mehrperioden- und Multi-Task-Strukturen


  • Ewert, Ralf
  • Niemann, Reiner


In diesem Beitrag werden sowohl persönliche Steuern des Agenten als auch die vom Prinzipal zu tragende Unternehmenssteuer in ein Agency-Modell des LEN-Typs integriert. Wir analysieren die Auswirkungen dieser Steuern auf die optimale Anreizgestaltung. Für das Grundmodell mit nur einer operativen Aktion des Agenten ergeben sich nur wenig qualitative Änderungen gegenüber einem Ansatz ohne Steuern. Wenn der Agent neben operativen Tätigkeiten auch Maßnahmen zur Steuervermeidung setzen kann, treten unerwartete Resultate auf. Wir zeigen verschiedene Steuerparadoxa auf, so z.B. den Effekt, dass sich die Zielerreichung des Prinzipals mit höheren Unternehmenssteuern auch verbessern kann oder dass steuerplanungsbedingte Maßnahmen nicht streng monoton steigend in der Höhe der Unternehmenssteuersätze sind. Die Resultate lassen sich aus den Wechselwirkungen von Motivation, Risikoteilung und dem Einfluß der Unternehmensbesteuerung auf die Varianz von Nachsteuer-Cash-Flows erklären. Paradoxe Steuerwirkungen können auch in einem Ansatz, in dem der Agent mit differenzierten Bonusparametern gesteuert werden kann, gezeigt werden.

Suggested Citation

  • Ewert, Ralf & Niemann, Reiner, 2012. "Steuern in Agency-Modellen: Mehrperioden- und Multi-Task-Strukturen," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 135, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:arqudp:135

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Rainer Niemann, 2011. "Asymmetric Taxation and Performance-Based Incentive Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 3363, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Rainer Niemann & Dirk Simons, 2003. "Costs, Benefits, And Tax-Induced Distortions Of Stock Option Plans," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 55(4), pages 321-341, October.
    3. Rees, Ray, 1985. "The Theory of Principal and Agent: Part 2," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 75-95, May.
    4. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
    5. Vesa Kanniainen, 1999. "Failures in Corporate Governance: Can the Corporation Tax Improve Efficiency?," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 56(3/4), pages 310-310, July.
    6. Rees, Ray, 1985. "The Theory of Principal and Agent: Part 1," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(1), pages 3-26, January.
    7. Christelle Viauroux & Barnali Gupta, 2009. "Is Tax sharing Optimal? An Analysis in a Principal-Agent Framework," UMBC Economics Department Working Papers 09-105, UMBC Department of Economics.
    8. Rainer Niemann, 2008. "The Effects of Differential Taxation on Managerial Effort and Risk Taking," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 64(3), pages 273-310, September.
    9. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    10. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    11. Kanniainen, Vesa, 2000. "Empire building by corporate managers:: the corporation as a savings instrument," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 127-142, January.
    12. Brunello, Giorgio & Comi, Simona & Sonedda, Daniela, 2006. "Income Taxes and the Composition of Pay," IZA Discussion Papers 2203, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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    More about this item


    Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Steuerplanung; Unternehmensbesteuerung; Lohnsteuer; Multi-Task-Modelle;

    JEL classification:

    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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