Steuern in Agency-Modellen: Mehrperioden- und Multi-Task-Strukturen
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More about this item
KeywordsPrinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Steuerplanung; Unternehmensbesteuerung; Lohnsteuer; Multi-Task-Modelle;
- H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
- M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
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