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Is Tax sharing Optimal? An Analysis in a Principal-Agent Framework

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Abstract

We study the effects of a statutory wage tax sharing rule in a principal - agent framework with moral hazard (à la Holmstrom, 1979) using the approach of Bose, Pal, Sappington (2007) to model the stochastic relationship between the agent’s unobserved effort and his observed performance. The analysis indicates that tax sharing with positive legislated contributions from both the employer and employee does not maximize any of the outcomes - employee effort, wages, profits or welfare. Moreover, a rule which specifies a corner solution, with 100% of the tax statutorily levied on the employer will maximize effort, expected profit and expected welfare while 100% of the tax statutorily levied on the employee will maximize expected wages.

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  • Christelle Viauroux & Barnali Gupta, 2009. "Is Tax sharing Optimal? An Analysis in a Principal-Agent Framework," UMBC Economics Department Working Papers 09-105, UMBC Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:umb:econwp:09105
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    File URL: http://www.umbc.edu/economics/wpapers/wp_09_105.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Seade, J. K., 1977. "On the shape of optimal tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 203-235, April.
    2. Jonathan Eaton & Harvey S. Rosen, 1979. "Taxation, Human Capital, and Uncertainty," Working Papers 497, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    3. David E. M. Sappington, 1991. "Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 45-66, Spring.
    4. Feldstein, Martin, 1995. "The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(3), pages 551-572, June.
    5. Arup Bose & Debashis Pal & David E. M. Sappington, 2011. "On the Performance of Linear Contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 159-193, March.
    6. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    7. Eaton, Jonathan & Rosen, Harvey S., 1980. "Labor supply, uncertainty, and efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 365-374, December.
    8. Jewitt, Ian, 1988. "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1177-1190, September.
    9. Feldstein, Martin, 1995. "The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(3), pages 551-572, June.
    10. Diamond, Peter A, 1998. "Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 83-95, March.
    11. Eaton, Jonathan & Rosen, Harvey S, 1980. "Taxation, Human Capital, and Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 705-715, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rainer Niemann, 2011. "Asymmetric Taxation and Performance-Based Incentive Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 3363, CESifo.
    2. Doina Radulescu, 2012. "The Effects of a Bonus Tax on Manager Compensation and Welfare," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 68(1), pages 1-16, March.
    3. Thomas Bauer & Thomas Kourouxous & Peter Krenn, 2018. "Taxation and agency conflicts between firm owners and managers: a review," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 11(1), pages 33-76, February.
    4. Fabian Meißner & Georg Schneider & Andreas Scholze, 2014. "Vergleichende Analyse verschiedener Ausprägungen einer erhöhten Besteuerung von Bonuszahlungen," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 66(3), pages 212-241, May.
    5. Robert Krämer & Vilen Lipatov, 2012. "Opportunities to Divert, Firm Value, and Taxation: Theory and Evidence from European Firms," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 68(1), pages 17-47, March.
    6. Ewert, Ralf & Niemann, Reiner, 2012. "Steuern in Agency-Modellen: Mehrperioden- und Multi-Task-Strukturen," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 135, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    moral hazard; taxes; principal-agent model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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