Is Tax sharing Optimal? An Analysis in a Principal-Agent Framework
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- Doina Radulescu & Doina Maria Radulescu, 2010. "The Effects of a Bonus Tax on Manager Compensation and Welfare," CESifo Working Paper Series 3030, CESifo.
- Fabian Meißner & Georg Schneider & Andreas Scholze, 2014. "Vergleichende Analyse verschiedener Ausprägungen einer erhöhten Besteuerung von Bonuszahlungen," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 66(3), pages 212-241, May.
- Robert Krämer & Vilen Lipatov, 2012. "Opportunities to Divert, Firm Value, and Taxation: Theory and Evidence from European Firms," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 68(1), pages 17-47, March.
- Rainer Niemann, 2011. "Asymmetric Taxation and Performance-Based Incentive Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 3363, CESifo.
- Ewert, Ralf & Niemann, Reiner, 2012. "Steuern in Agency-Modellen: Mehrperioden- und Multi-Task-Strukturen," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 135, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
- Thomas Bauer & Thomas Kourouxous & Peter Krenn, 2018. "Taxation and agency conflicts between firm owners and managers: a review," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 11(1), pages 33-76, February.
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More about this item
Keywords
moral hazard; taxes; principal-agent model;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2009-10-10 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-LAB-2009-10-10 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2009-10-10 (Public Economics)
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