On the Performance of Linear Contracts
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- Debashis Pal & Arup Bose & David Sappington, 2007. "On the Performance of Linear Contracts," University of Cincinnati, Economics Working Papers Series 2007-05, University of Cincinnati, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ramalingam, Abhijit, 2014. "On the value of relative comparisons in firms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(3), pages 446-448.
- Emre M. Demirezen & Subodha Kumar & Bala Shetty, 2016. "Managing Co-Creation in Information Technology Projects: A Differential Games Approach," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 27(3), pages 517-537.
- Christelle Viauroux & Barnali Gupta, 2009. "Is Tax sharing Optimal? An Analysis in a Principal-Agent Framework," UMBC Economics Department Working Papers 09-105, UMBC Department of Economics.
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- Daniel Herold, 2017. "The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201752, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
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