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Incentives for Effective Risk Management

Author

Listed:
  • Jón Daníelsson

    (London School of Economics)

  • Bjørn N. Jorgensen

    (Harvard Business School)

  • Casper G. de Vries

    (Erasmus University Rotterdam, and NIAS)

Abstract

Under the new Capital Accord, banks choose between two different types of risk management systems, the standard or the internal rating based approach. The paper considers how a bank's preference for a risk management system is affected by the presence of supervision by bank regulators. The model uses a principal–agent setting between a bank's owner and its risk management. The main conclusion is that previously unregulated institutions can be expected to switch to the lower quality standard approach subsequent to becoming regulated, i.e., the presence of regulation may induce a bank to decrease the quality of its risk management system. Published in Journal of Banking and Finance (2002) 26, 1407-25.

Suggested Citation

  • Jón Daníelsson & Bjørn N. Jorgensen & Casper G. de Vries, 2001. "Incentives for Effective Risk Management," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 01-094/2, Tinbergen Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20010094
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jane E. Ihrig & Edward Kim & Cindy M. Vojtech & Gretchen C. Weinbach, 2019. "How Have Banks Been Managing the Composition of High-Quality Liquid Assets?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 101(3).
    2. Grzegorz Haᴌaj & Christoffer Kok, 2015. "Modelling the emergence of the interbank networks," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(4), pages 653-671, April.
    3. Szego, Giorgio, 2005. "Measures of risk," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 163(1), pages 5-19, May.
    4. Pérignon, Christophe & Smith, Daniel R., 2010. "The level and quality of Value-at-Risk disclosure by commercial banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 362-377, February.
    5. Pantano, Eleonora & Iazzolino, Gianpaolo & Migliano, Giuseppe, 2013. "Obsolescence risk in advanced technologies for retailing: A management perspective," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 225-233.
    6. Pierre Jinghong Liang & Lin Nan, 2014. "Endogenous Precision of Performance Measures and Limited Managerial Attention," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 693-727, December.
    7. Born Patricia & Lin Hong-Jen & Wen Min-Ming & Yang Charles C., 2009. "The Dynamic Interactions between Risk Management, Capital Management, and Financial Management in the U.S. Property/Liability Insurance Industry," Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and Insurance, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-21, November.
    8. Frésard, Laurent & Pérignon, Christophe & Wilhelmsson, Anders, 2011. "The pernicious effects of contaminated data in risk management," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(10), pages 2569-2583, October.
    9. Tsionas, Mike G. & Mamatzakis, Emmanuel & Ongena, Steven, 2020. "Does risk aversion affect bank output loss? The case of the Eurozone," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 282(3), pages 1127-1145.
    10. Yung-Ho Chiu & Chyanlong Jan & Da-Bai Shen & Pen-Chun Wang, 2008. "Efficiency and capital adequacy in Taiwan banking: BCC and super-DEA estimation," The Service Industries Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(4), pages 479-496, May.
    11. Grzegorz Hałaj, 2016. "Dynamic Balance Sheet Model With Liquidity Risk," International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance (IJTAF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(07), pages 1-37, November.
    12. Keppo, Jussi & Kofman, Leonard & Meng, Xu, 2010. "Unintended consequences of the market risk requirement in banking regulation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(10), pages 2192-2214, October.
    13. Norvald Instefjord & Kouji Sasaki, 2007. "Proprietary trading losses in banks: do banks invest sufficiently in control?," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 329-350, July.
    14. Claußen, Arndt & Rösch, Daniel & Schmelzle, Martin, 2019. "Hedging parameter risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 111-121.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Risk management systems; Regulation; Value-at-Risk; Basel-II;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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