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Az ügynökprobléma néhány aspektusa az átmeneti gazdaságban
[Some aspects of the agent problem in the transition economy]

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  • Bodó, Péter

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  • Bodó, Péter, 1996. "Az ügynökprobléma néhány aspektusa az átmeneti gazdaságban [Some aspects of the agent problem in the transition economy]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(4), pages 342-349.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1017
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Demougin, Dominique & Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1994. "Privatization, risk-taking, and the communist firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 203-231, October.
    2. Roland, Gerard, 1993. "The political economy of restructuring and privatization in Eastern Europe," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 533-540, April.
    3. Stanislaw Gomulka, 1995. "The IMF-Supported Programs of Poland and Russia, 1990-1994: Principles, Errors and Results," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0036, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
    4. Coricelli, Fabrizio & Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, 1993. "On the credibility of 'big bang' programs: A note on wage claims and soft budget constraints in economies in transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 387-395, April.
    5. Schmidt Klaus M. & Schnitzer Monika, 1993. "Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 264-287, June.
    6. Perotti, Enrico C., 1993. "Bank lending in transition economies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 1021-1032, September.
    7. Katz B. G. & Owen J., 1995. "Designing and Optimal Privatisation Plan for Restructuring Firms and Institutes in Transition," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-28, August.
    8. Roman Frydman & Andrzej Rapaczynski, 1993. "Insiders and the state: overview of responses to agency problems in East European privatizations," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 1(1), pages 39-59, January.
    9. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025.
    10. Ellman M., 1994. "Transformation, Depression, and Economics: Some Lessons," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-21, August.
    11. Portes, Richard, 1994. "Transformation Traps," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(426), pages 1178-1189, September.
    12. Aghion, Philippe & Blanchard, Olivier & Burgess, Robin, 1994. "The behaviour of state firms in eastern Europe, pre-privatisation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(6), pages 1327-1349, June.
    13. Zou, Liang, 1992. "Ownership structure and efficiency: An incentive mechanism approach," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 399-431, September.
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