Privatization, Risk-Taking, and the Communist Firm
This paper studies alternative methods of privatizing a formerly communist firm in the presence of imperfect risk markets. The methods include cash sales, a give-away scheme, and a participation contract where the government retains a sleeping fractional ownership in the firm. It is shown that with competitive bidding, the participation contract dominates cash sales because it generates both more private restructuring investment and a higher expected present value of revenue for the government. Under weak conditions the participation contract will induce more investment than the giveaway scheme, and it may even share the cash sales' virtue of incentive compatibility.
|Date of creation:||Jan 1993|
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- Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
- Meyer, Jack, 1987. "Two-moment Decision Models and Expected Utility Maximization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 421-30, June.
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Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
353, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Ahsan, Syed M, 1974. "Progression and Risk-Taking," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(3), pages 318-28, November.
- Bulow, Jeremy I & Summers, Lawrence H, 1984.
"The Taxation of Risky Assets,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(1), pages 20-39, February.
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