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Introduction to "The Economics of Information and Uncertainty"

In: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty

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  • John J. McCall

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  • John J. McCall, 1982. "Introduction to "The Economics of Information and Uncertainty"," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, pages -11, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:4430
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1974. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(2), pages 219-255.
    2. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    3. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-139, May.
    4. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
    5. James A. Mirrlees, 1976. "The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 105-131, Spring.
    6. Hirshleifer, J & Riley, John G, 1979. "The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information-An Expository Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 1375-1421, December.
    7. Baron, David P, 1979. "Investment Policy, Optimality, and the Mean-Variance Model: Review Article," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 34(1), pages 207-232, March.
    8. Diamond, Peter & Rothschild, Michael (ed.), 1978. "Uncertainty in Economics," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 1, number 9780122148507.
    9. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1979. "Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 231-259, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kuzmin, E. A., 2012. "Uncertainty & Certainty in Management of Organizational-Economic Systems," MPRA Paper 42006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. G L Clark, 1986. "Towards an Alternative Conception of Job-Search Theory and Policy: Information as an Indeterminate Process," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 18(6), pages 803-825, June.
    3. Kuzmin, Evgeny Anatol'evich, 2012. "Analytical content of properties of uncertainty and certainty of organizational-economic systems: derivatives indicators," MPRA Paper 39584, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. MacAuley, Molly K., 2005. "The Value of Information: A Background Paper on Measuring the Contribution of Space-Derived Earth Science Data to National Resource Management," Discussion Papers 10839, Resources for the Future.
    5. Lundgren, Lena & Rankin, Bruce, 1998. "What matters more: The job training program or the background of the participant? An HLM analysis of the influence of program and client characteristics on the wages of inner-city youth who have compl," Evaluation and Program Planning, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 111-120, February.
    6. Kuzmin, Evgeny, 2014. "Individual Scaling and Overall Evaluation of System Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 60509, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Georges Prat, 1996. "Le modèle d'évaluation des actions confronté aux anticipations des agents informés," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(1), pages 85-110.
    8. Karl Duvemo & Tomas Lämås & Ljusk Eriksson & Peder Wikström, 2014. "Introducing cost-plus-loss analysis into a hierarchical forestry planning environment," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 219(1), pages 415-431, August.

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