Incentives for Diversification and the Structure of the Conglomerate Firm
In this paper, we examine the proposition that both the structures of conglomerate firms and their merger activities evidence a systematic attempt to diversify income sources and reduce the volatility of firms' profits. We test whether firms that are active in one line of business are more likely to be involved in another, the lower is the correlation between returns to the two activities, and whether, ceteris paribus, the likelihood of merger depends inversely on the correlation of cash flows to the principal activities of thecandidates for merger. We conclude that firms do act as if their goals include firm-level diversification.
|Date of creation:||Feb 1984|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Marshall, William J. , Jess B. Yawitz and Edward Greenberg. "Incentives for Diversification and the Structure of the Conglomerate Firm." Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1, (July 1984), pp. 1-23.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Heckerman, Donald G., 1975. "Motivating managers to make investment decisions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 273-292, September.
- Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
- Michael C. Jensen & John B. Long Jr., 1972. "Corporate Investment under Uncertainty and Pareto Optimality in the Capital Markets," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 3(1), pages 151-174, Spring.
- Baron, David P, 1979. "Investment Policy, Optimality, and the Mean-Variance Model: Review Article," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 34(1), pages 207-32, March.
- Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972.
"Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December.
- Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Lemelin, Andre, 1982. "Relatedness in the Patterns of Interindustry Diversification," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 64(4), pages 646-57, November.
- Galai, Dan & Masulis, Ronald W., 1976. "The option pricing model and the risk factor of stock," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1-2), pages 53-81.
- Eugene F. Fama, 1972. "Perfect Competition and Optimal Production Decisions under Uncertainty," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 3(2), pages 509-530, Autumn.
- Grabowski, Henry G & Mueller, Dennis C, 1972. "Managerial and Stockholder Welfare Models of Firm Expenditures," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 54(1), pages 9-24, February.
- J. E. Stiglitz, 1972. "On the Optimality of the Stock Market Allocation of Investment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 86(1), pages 25-60.
- Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1979. "Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 231-259, April.
- Greenberg, Edward & Marshall, William J & Yawitz, Jess B, 1978. "The Technology of Risk and Return," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(3), pages 241-51, June.
- Maloney, Michael T & McCormick, Robert E, 1983. "A Theory of Cost and Intermittent Production," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(2), pages 139-53, April.
- Ross, Stephen A, 1978. "The Current Status of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 33(3), pages 885-901, June.
- Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
- Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-39, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:1280. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.