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Quo Vadis? Suggestions for future corporate governance research

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  • Henry Tosi

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  • Henry Tosi, 2008. "Quo Vadis? Suggestions for future corporate governance research," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 12(2), pages 153-169, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:12:y:2008:i:2:p:153-169
    DOI: 10.1007/s10997-008-9054-9
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    2. Christopher, Joe, 2012. "Tension between the corporate and collegial cultures of Australian public universities: The current status," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 23(7), pages 556-571.
    3. Bruno van Pottelsberghe, 2011. "Corporate governance practices and companies' R&D orientation- evidence from European countries," Working Papers 492, Bruegel.
    4. Szymon Kaczmarek & Satomi Kimino & Annie Pye, 2014. "Interlocking directorships and firm performance in highly regulated sectors: the moderating impact of board diversity," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(2), pages 347-372, May.
    5. Maximilian Sturm & Stephan Nüesch, 2019. "Strong shareholder rights, internal capital allocation efficiency, and the moderating role of market competition and external financing needs," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 93-111, February.
    6. Lélis Pedro Andrade & Aureliano Angel Bressan & Robert Aldo Iquiapaza, 2017. "Dual class shares, board of directors’ effectiveness and firm’s market value: an empirical study," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 21(4), pages 1053-1092, December.
    7. Krista B. Lewellyn & Maureen I. Muller-Kahle, 2016. "The configurational effects of board monitoring and the institutional environment on CEO compensation: a country-level fuzzy-set analysis," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 20(4), pages 729-757, December.
    8. Gianpaolo Abatecola & Gabriele Mandarelli & Sara Poggesi, 2013. "The personality factor: how top management teams make decisions. A literature review," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 17(4), pages 1073-1100, November.
    9. John S. Marsh & Rachel Graefe-Anderson, 2018. "Undermining incentives: CEO reactions to compensation rebalancing," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 22(2), pages 365-391, June.
    10. Joe Christopher & Philomena Leung & Shane Leong, 2017. "Can Employees Be Used to Overcome Independent Audit Limitations?," Australian Accounting Review, CPA Australia, vol. 27(4), pages 442-456, December.
    11. Szymon Kaczmarek, 2017. "Rethinking board diversity with the behavioural theory of corporate governance: opportunities and challenges for advances in theorising," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 21(4), pages 879-906, December.
    12. Roberto Di Pietra, 2011. "Seeking and finding emerging issues in management and governance," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 15(3), pages 309-310, August.

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