IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/kondp2/109.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Politische Ökonomie des Protektionismus: Ein institutioneller Ansatz

Author

Listed:
  • Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore

Abstract

Bestehende und anhaltende Handelshemmnisse in den internationalen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen werden in der Politischen Ökonomie des Protektionismus anhand der interdependenten Beziehung zwischen Nachfragern und Anbietern im politischen Markt für Protektion erklärt. Die politisch-institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen legen fest, weiche Möglichkeiten den Wählern und den Vertretern spezifischer ökonomischer Interessen zur Verfügung stehen, um die politischen Entscheidungen zu ihren Gunsten zu beeinflussen. Sie bestimmen andererseits auch den diskretionären Spielraum, der den Politikern und der öffentlichen Verwaltung zur Verfügung steht, um ihre eigenen Interessen zu verfolgen. In diesem Beitrag wird abzuklären gesucht, in welcher Weise unterschiedliche institutionelle Rahmenbedingungen das Gesamtniveau und die Zusammensetzung der interventionistischen Eingriffe in den Aussenhandel beeinflussen. Dabei steht nicht die Analyse der ökonomischen Bedingungen als vielmehr die vergleichende Analyse alternativer Institutionen im Vordergrund. Es werden Folgerungen sowohl über den (relativen) Protektionsgrad in unterschiedlichen politisch-ökonomischen Systemen als auch im Hinblick auf die Struktur des Protektionismus abgeleitet. Die Aussagen sind prinzipiell einer empirischen Testung zugänglich. Eine solche umfassende empirische Überprüfung wird in diesem Beitrag allerdings nicht vorgenommen, sondern es werden bereits vorliegende empirische Studien auf ihren "institutionellen" Gehalt ausgewertet. Abschliessend werden mögliche Erweiterungen der Analyse erörtert.

Suggested Citation

  • Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore, 1990. "Politische Ökonomie des Protektionismus: Ein institutioneller Ansatz," Discussion Papers, Series II 109, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:kondp2:109
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/101544/1/770157181.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Magee,Stephen P. & Brock,William A. & Young,Leslie, 1989. "Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521377003, January.
    2. Pommerehne, Werner W., 1990. "The empirical relevance of comparative institutional analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 458-469, May.
    3. McArthur, John & Marks, Stephen V, 1988. "Constitutent Interest vs. Legislator Ideology: The Role of Political Opportunity Cost," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(3), pages 461-470, July.
    4. Krugman, Paul R, 1987. "Is Free Trade Passe?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 131-144, Fall.
    5. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    6. Mayer, Wolfgang & Riezman, Raymond G., 1987. "Endogenous choice of trade policy instruments," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 377-381, November.
    7. William Kaempfer & Thomas Willett, 1989. "Combining rent-seeking and public choice theory in the analysis of tariffs versus quotas," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 79-86, October.
    8. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
    9. Amelung, Torsten, 1989. "The Determinants of Protection in Developing Countries: An Extended Interest-Group Approach," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 42(4), pages 515-532.
    10. Amelung, Torsten, 1989. "The Determinants of Protection in Developing Countries: An Extended Interest-Group Approach," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(4), pages 515-532.
    11. Hillman, Arye L, 1982. "Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1180-1187, December.
    12. Schuknecht, Ludger, 1989. "The political economy of EC protectionism: National protectionism based on art. 115, treaty of Rome," Discussion Papers, Series II 81, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    13. Baldwin, Robert E, 1989. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 119-135, Fall.
    14. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-985, December.
    15. Coughlin, Cletus C, 1985. "Domestic Content Legislation: House Voting and the Economic Theory of Regulation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 23(3), pages 437-448, July.
    16. Hillman, Arye L & Ursprung, Heinrich W, 1988. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 719-745, September.
    17. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1979. "Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(4), pages 563-587.
    18. Patrick Messerlin, 1981. "The political economy of protectionism : The bureaucratic case," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 117(3), pages 469-496, September.
    19. Takacs, Wendy E, 1981. "Pressures for Protectionism: An Empirical Analysis," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(4), pages 687-693, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore, 1989. "Protectionism in direct democracy," Discussion Papers, Series II 79, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    2. Nelson, Douglas, 2006. "The political economy of antidumping: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 554-590, September.
    3. Gould, David M. & Woodbridge, Graeme L., 1998. "The political economy of retaliation, liberalization and trade wars," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 115-137, February.
    4. Pyne, Derek, 2006. "Microfoundations of Influencing Public Opinion: Lobbying and Voting for Trade Policies," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 21, pages 551-576.
    5. Bin, Sheng, 2000. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy in China," Working Papers 10/2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Management, Politics & Philosophy.
    6. César Calderón & Alberto Chong, 2005. "Do Democracies Breed Rent-Seeking Behavior?," Research Department Publications 4415, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    7. Das, Satya P., 2001. "Endogenous distribution and the political economy of trade policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 465-491, September.
    8. Pravin Krishna & Devashish Mitra, 2003. "Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Policy: An Interest-Group Approach," NBER Working Papers 9631, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. César Calderón & Alberto Chong, 2005. "¿Fomentan las democracias conductas de procura de rentas?," Research Department Publications 4416, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    10. Pokrivcak, Jan, 2007. "Economics and Political Economy of Regional Trade Agreements," Working Papers 7286, TRADEAG - Agricultural Trade Agreements.
    11. Kishore Gawande & Pravin Krishna & Michael J. Robbins, 2006. "Foreign Lobbies and U.S. Trade Policy," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(3), pages 563-571, August.
    12. Afontsev Serguey, 2000. "Political Economy of Tariff Protection in Russia: an Empirical Study," EERC Working Paper Series 99-16e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    13. Mario Tello Pacheco, 2022. "The Political Economy of Trade Barriers in Peru," Apuntes del Cenes, Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia, vol. 41(74), pages 71-107, July.
    14. Richard T. Cupitt & Euel Elliott, 1994. "Schattschneider Revisited: Senate Voting On The Smoot‐Hawley Tariff Act Of 1930," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 187-199, November.
    15. Martín Rama, 1994. "Endogenous Trade Policy: A Time‐Series Approach," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 215-232, November.
    16. Maggi, Giovanni & Rodriguez-Clare, Andres, 2000. "Import penetration and the politics of trade protection," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 287-304, August.
    17. Wilfred J. Ethier & Arye L. Hillman, 2017. "The Politics of International Trade," CESifo Working Paper Series 6456, CESifo.
    18. Arnaud Costinot & Iván Werning, 2023. "Robots, Trade, and Luddism: A Sufficient Statistic Approach to Optimal Technology Regulation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(5), pages 2261-2291.
    19. Josh Ederington & Jenny Minier, 2003. "Is environmental policy a secondary trade barrier? An empirical analysis," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 36(1), pages 137-154, February.
    20. Feeney, JoAnne & Hillman, Arye L., 1995. "Asset markets and individual trade policy preferences," Discussion Papers, Series II 282, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:kondp2:109. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fwkonde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.