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Who do you Blame in Local Finance? An Analysis of Municipal Financing in Italy

  • Massimo Bordignon
  • Santino Piazza

A 1999 reform allowed Italian Mayors to partially substitute a more accountable source of tax revenue (the property tax) with a less transparent one (a surcharge on the personal income tax). Theoretical analysis suggests this should give incompetent Mayors a less costly way to hide themselves, so allowing them to be more easily re-elected. An empirical analysis on Piedmont municipalities confirms these hypotheses.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2010/wp-cesifo-2010-06/cesifo1_wp3100.pdf
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3100.

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Date of creation: 2010
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3100
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  1. Marcelin Joanis, 2009. "Intertwined Federalism: Accountability Problems under Partial Decentralization," CIRANO Working Papers 2009s-39, CIRANO.
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  8. Jan K. Brueckner, 2007. "Partial Fiscal Decentralization," Working Papers 070804, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  9. Thiess Buettner, 2001. "Local Business Taxation and Competition for Capital: The Choice of the Tax Rate," CESifo Working Paper Series 440, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Windmeijer, Frank, 2005. "A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 25-51, May.
  11. Inman, Robert P., 1989. "The local decision to tax : Evidence from large U.S. Cities," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 455-491, August.
  12. Besley, Timothy, 2007. "Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199283910, December.
  13. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1986. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," NBER Working Papers 1838, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, 2003. "Fiscal Transparency and Fiscal Policy Outcomes in OECD Countries," EPRU Working Paper Series 03-02, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  15. Tim Besley & Harvey S. Rosen, 1997. "Vertical externalities in tax settings: evidence from gasoline and cigarettes," IFS Working Papers W97/23, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  16. Bordignon, Massimo & Cerniglia, Floriana & Revelli, Federico, 2003. "In search of yardstick competition: a spatial analysis of Italian municipality property tax setting," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 199-217, September.
  17. Sergio Sakurai & Naercio Menezes-Filho, 2008. "Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 301-314, October.
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